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work was done as part of an internship at CERN, the European Organization for
Nuclear Research, where users and staff rely on several IT services as a support for
their daily work. For software development such services include issue tracking,
software repository hosting and version control. Scientific computing relies on
services such as batch processing or volunteer computing portals. All of these
services run on a common cloud infrastructure with a common monitoring system
in place.
This thesis presents the development of a monitoring framework that was created to
improve the detection of service degradation and to reduce the amount of noise that
a service responsible is exposed to, as they maintain a service, which is equipped
with a monitoring system that creates and sends a large amount of alerts. Two of
the main challenges were to take appropriate advantage of generic and existing
monitoring components in the planning and implementation phases, and to follow
the ongoing development of the monitoring and cloud management tools at CERN.
Two different use cases are considered: a large service where negligible alarms occur,
and a small service where single alarms are important. The conclusion from testing
the framework prototype on real data in a large service, as well as an interview
with two service responsibles, indicates that the filtering capability provided by
this framework can be an influential tool for efficient fault detection and correction
in real-world scenarios. In addition to these cases, the thesis describes the existing
infrastructure, large-scale monitoring in general, as well as recommendations for
future work and extensions for the CERN IT monitoring infrastructure.
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Den ökade uppkomsten av molntjänster under det senaste decenniet har lett till
förändringar inom informationstekniska tjänstearkitekturer. Som en följd av detta
håller man även på att omskapa de existerande lösningarna för tjänsteövervakning
(monitorering) samt vidareutveckla dessa, i avsikt att underlätta driften av sådana
virtualiserade, skalerbara samt dynamiska miljöer. Detta diplomarbete är utfört
som en del av författarens tid som praktikant vid CERN, den Europeiska organisa-
tionen för kärnforskning, där användare och personal förlitar sig på en mångfald
av IT-tjänster som ett stöd för sitt dagliga arbete. Alla dessa tjänster körs på en
gemensam molnplattform och övervakas av en gemensam programvara.
Detta diplomarbete presenterar utvecklandet av ett monitoreringsramverk som
skapades för att göra det lättare att upptäcka försämrad tjänstekvalitet. Ett annat
nämnvärt syfte var att minska informationsflödet från det existerande alarmerings-
systemet. Många tjänsteansvariga utsätts nu för en flod av alarm då något allvarligt
sker i en servergrupp, då de istället kunde notifieras en gång. Två av de största
utmaningarna med arbetet var att tillgodogöra sig existerande monitorerings- och
förvaltningsverktyg som finns i bruk vid CERN, samt följa med utvecklingen av
dessa verktyg.
Två separata användningsfall beaktas: en stor tjänst där oväsentliga alarm förekom-
mer, samt en mindre tjänst där varje enskilt alarm är viktigt. Slutsatserna från att
ha experimenterat med prototypen av ramverket på äkta data i en stor tjänst, samt
en intervju med två serviceansvariga, tyder på att ramverkets förmåga att verka som
ett informationsfilter kan vara ett betydelsefullt verktyg för att effektivt uppdaga
och korrigera fel. I tillägg presenterar arbetet den existerande infrastrukturen,
storskalig monitorering i allmänhet, samt rekommendationer för framtida arbete
och vidareutveckling av infrastrukturen för monitorering vid CERN.
Nyckelord: Monitorering, aggregerade alarm, notifiering, molntjänster, CERN,
European Organization for Nuclear Research
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AI Agile Infrastructure group
ALICE A Large Ion Collider Experiment, an LHC experiment.
API Application Programming Interface
ATLAS A Toroidal LHC ApparatuS, an LHC experiment.
BOINC Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing
CC CERN Computing Center
CEP Complex Event Processing
CERN European Organzation for Nuclear Research
CLI Command Line Interface
CMS Compact Muon Solenoid, an LHC experiment.
DCS Detector Control System
DB Database
FE Functional Element
FSM Finite State Machine
GNI General Notification Infrastructure
GUI Graphical User Interface
HDFS Hadoop File System
HG Host group
HTTP Hyper-Text Transfer Protocol
ID Identification
IT Information Technology
IO Input/Output
JSON JavaScript Object Notation
LEMON LHC Era MONitoring, part of the CERN monitoring infrastructure.
LHC Large Hadron Collider
LHCb Large Hadron Collider beauty, an LHC experiment.
MQ Message Queue
QA Quality Assurance
REST Representational State Transfer
SCOM System Center Operations Manager, management system for
datacenters.
SLA Service Level Agreement
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SNOW Service NOW, a commercial service management software.
SSO Single Sign-On, an access control property where the user only authenti-
cates once and can access several services with the same authentication.
SQL Structured Query Language
TDD Test-Driven Development
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
VCS Version Control Systems
VM Virtual Machine
YAML YAML Ain’t Markup Language
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Glossary
Metric A class that will measure or calculate one or more values which are sent
to the lemon agent. The metric is identified by a unique number and its
name.
Sensor A script (Perl, Python) written by a user. It contains a collection of
measured metrics.
1 Introduction
This Master’s thesis presents a framework for monitoring and attempted automatic
failure correction based on preconfigured policies. The work was done as part of
a year-long internship in the Infrastructure Services section in the IT Platform &
Engineering Services group at CERN, as an effort to improve the section- and group-
wide monitoring. The framework was designed and created to solve the problem of
aggregating notification data from several hosts and to detect failures based on the
aggregation.
The current monitoring infrastructure generates notifications for errors in single
hosts, and it is possible to manually query for aggregation data in the presentation
layer of the monitoring infrastructure. However, the created framework is able to
automatically monitor and collect the notification messages as they are sent and
group the notifications by the host group they are sent from. For each host group, a
policy can be defined containing information about the notifications that are ignored
or counted, as well as actions that are taken if a defined amount of hosts in the same
group are sending notifications. The actions include arbitrary shell commands or
scripts whose execution results can be sent as e-mails to the service responsible or
simply e-mails that are sent stating that something is wrong.
The added benefits of this thesis work include a possible reduction of the time
spent investigating the impact of a service failure, the chance for a service owner to
gain an overview of the failing machines in a host group in a single e-mail message,
the opportunity to automatically attempt to correct the failure by configuring an
action, and the convenience of configuring an individual policy for each host group.
Challenges were also encountered during the development process. For example,
the framework design was constrained by the architecture and software used in the
current monitoring infrastructure, and limitations had to be implemented to avoid
accidental damage or e-mail floods caused by a misconfigured framework. The final
version of the prototype was tested on real data by allowing it to run for several
days while collecting both the received messages and the actions in log files that
the framework generates. This was done in order to investigate the ways in which
the framework behaves both on busy and calm days. The conclusion was that the
framework can act as a configurable filter and aggregation tool for the notifications.
The thesis is structured as follows: Section 1 briefly describes the problem and
research goals, as well as discusses research limitations and similar work. Section 2
presents the background to monitoring in large-scale computing environments and a
brief overview of the different meanings the concept of monitoring holds within. In
Section 3 the existing CERN IT monitoring infrastructure is presented, broken down
into the different stages and components that exist in the monitoring system. Section
4 explains the architecture of the framework that was created as an extension of the
existing monitoring infrastructure. In Section 5 the automation capabilities of the
framework are discussed, with Section 6 showing the practical tests and experiments
that were done with the framework. Finally, Section 7 explores future work to be
done, a brief evaluation of the used methodologies, and the conclusions drawn from
the current work.
21.1 Problem definition and research goals
This thesis work is an attempt at solving the problem of gathering notification data
from several groups of hosts, and aggregating that information to form a conclusion,
whether the notifications indicate a problem with a single machine or a group of
machines. In the currently existing monitoring system it is possible to monitor the
state of individual machines and automatically notify the service owner in the case of
a service malfunction. Since it is considered better to have more false positives than
false negatives, the alarms can lead to copious amounts of e-mails and can give rise
to automatically opened tickets in the incident ticket system that is used. It is for
example possible that a machine is under high load (as it is supposed to be) during
which time the current monitoring system cannot reach the machine. If the state of
being unreachable persists, there is a risk that the monitoring system believes the
machine to be malfunctioning and as a consequence sends out a notification. As the
service owner receives the notification, valuable time is spent investigating a possible
problem, only to conclude that the single notification was a false alarm.
The aim of this thesis is to develop a framework that is able to aggregate alarms
from groups of machines and trigger different actions based on sums of individual
notifications. The framework will be able to keep track of the state of a group of
machines, which improves the diagnosing process. It will be possible to configure
whether to inform the service owner when a single machine in a group has an issue or
whether to inform the service owner only when a significant number of machines are
sending notifications. The framework will also be configurable to run a command,
for example, collecting information from log files, which is sent out along with the
notification e-mail, or sending a ping to another service to see if the main service is
malfunctioning as a consequence of another service malfunction.
The research goal is to develop a framework that is able to correctly identify and
discern between situations when there is a small temporary disturbance in a group of
machines, and when a larger problem has built up, and only then notify the service
owner. Challenges related to this work include, but are not restricted to, the following
list: storing and knowing the state of the host groups at a certain point in time, the
ability to extend the framework with new actions, keeping the framework simple,
exploring the available technologies and programming libraries that are appropriate
to use, as well as creating a software that is easily can be integrated to the existing
systems and still be maintained when the software is finished.
1.2 Research limitations and similar work
One clear limitation is that there needs to be a policy defined for each host group that
is to be monitored. It means that it will take a certain amount of time and knowledge
to be able to know which notifications are important for a certain host group, and
which notifications can be safely ignored. It also means that the granularity is on a
host group level. It is for example not possible to ignore one machine that is behaving
differently from the others in the host group.
Since the idea of a host group is to combine similar machines, e.g., hosting a
3service, this granularity level is deemed to be sensible. On the other hand, if one
machine has several errors, this may not be noted, since the host group is regarded
as a whole. This may require some special consideration as the configuration files
for smaller host groups are defined, in case it is important to differentiate between
knowing that one machine has multiple errors and knowing that there is some
error in one machine. Another limitation is that it is important to follow what the
CERN monitoring team is working on, in order to avoid duplicated work. This is
resolved through meetings and discussions. It is also not possible to freely choose
and implement any software that might be found suitable for the task that is at
hand, since the seamless integration of this framework with tools that exist and are
used in the CERN IT infrastructure is important.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the CERN Computing Center (CC) is
currently working on renewing their workflow for partial shutdown of the CC in
the case of a cooling problem or power incident [41]. If an incident occurs, there
is an emergency UPS (uninterruptible power supply) system that will provide the
machines with power for a short amount of time. In this case it is important to
be able to shut down less important nodes, in order to save UPS power for the
critical infrastructure. The proposal now, is to automate the shutdown process by
creating a collection of scripts that would react if a cooling or power cut alarm is
received, and the situation does not seem to resolve itself after an amount of time
has passed. The problems are similar to the problems in this thesis work; essentially
assuring that no false shutdown is triggered, notifying the owners of the affected
(virtual) machines, authenticating the notifications to prevent malicious shutdown,
and ensuring the simplicity of the scripts to prevent unmaintainability. Similar work
from other academic areas that is related to monitoring and autonomous repairing
action is presented in Section 2.
In 2014 an analytics working group was formed at CERN IT to unify efforts
towards understanding and using the vast amount of information that can be gathered
from various sensors and log files in machines running services at CERN. The goal
is to gather common data to a single store and create common tools to facilitate
the work between groups in the IT department for aggregating and analysing such
as usage data and investigating trends. One of the four large experiments, the
ATLAS experiment, has also formed an analytics working group, which for example
is concerned with analysing and possibly predicting which datasets are accessed more
often than others, in order to be able to grant high availability for such datasets.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning a monitoring and alerting solution, Metis, that
monitors the messaging infrastructure at CERN. This software was released in April
20151. The author of this thesis found the work that was done on Mesis in late
April 2015, and stayed in touch with the autor of Mesis to learn the similarities and
differences between this framework and Mesis. Mesis is based on Esper2 which is an
engine for complex event processing (CEP). CEP is an independent area of research
involving processing individual events by, for example, creating an aggregation that
calculates a real-time average of a value that consists of several other streams of
1http://lucamag.web.cern.ch/lucamag/
2http://www.espertech.com/esper/index.php
4values [7]. In real applications, the calculations can of course be more complex than
an average value.
The most notable difference is that Metis monitors the status (metrics) of the
CERN messaging system [57], whereas the framework is meant for notification
aggregation, on a host group level for machines that are part of the IT infrastructure
at CERN. Other notable differences are that Mesis has been under development for
a significantly longer time and that the author has previous experience from working
on monitoring systems at CERN, and using the technologies that the software is
based upon [57]. A similar goal is the plan to integrate Mesis with the ticket creation
infrastructure which is described in Section 3.5 and to analyse logs for gaining
information on the current state of the messaging system.
Regarding limitations, with respect to the three properties that define Big Data,
"volume, variety, and velocity" [46], the framework itself will be designed to handle
notification messages from potentially around 3000 host groups of which around
90 host groups are of interest. In reality, it is considered fairly unlikely that every
single host would trigger a notification message, since in such cases it is likely that
the monitoring system that transmits the messages would also be impacted by the
same problem (e.g., a large-scale power outage). The messages have been observed
to arrive at a pace of around 400/minute depending on how busy the system is. The
number includes duplicates of the notification message, since notification messages
are continuously sent out until the initiator of the notification is resolved, whereupon
a (single) message indicating that the notification is closed is sent out.
52 Background
This section contains a short discussion on service monitoring in computing clouds,
and monitoring in general on a large scale. Academic work with different approaches
for monitoring as well as four different popular monitoring tools are described. The
different types of monitoring at CERN, as identified by the author, are presented.
Finally, the CERN IT services which are targeted by this thesis work are shown in
relation to the use cases and needs that were discovered before the development of
the monitoring framework was commenced.
The services and the monitoring which are discussed in this thesis work, are
hosted in computing clouds. By the NIST defintion [61], cloud computing is a pattern
that allows for sharing a collection of "configurable computing resources" which can
be requested, used, and liberated by the users with as little work and intervention
as possible being required by the maintainers and providers of the service. One of
the five dictinctive characteristics NIST lists for cloud computing, is that it is a
"measured service" [61]. This is meant in a sense that the use of resources should
be measurable for accounting purposes, which adds transparency for the service user,
and allows the service provider to monitor the usage (e.g., for service development
purposes). The definition also describes four different cloud models; private and
public clouds for private and public use, community cloud, which is shared by a
community with a common cause, and hybrid cloud which is a combination of at
least two other cloud types which are joined by common technology to ensure data
compatibility.
The cloud infrastructure which the services discussed in this thesis are based on,
is a private cloud that partially can be described as a community cloud, namely
the CERN Cloud Infrastructure3. This infrastructure is described in more detail
in Section 2.3. It is worth noting that the CERN cloud is distinguished from
the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) which is used by the High Energy
Physics (HEP) communities at CERN and globally, notably, for analyzing data
from LHC, the Large Hadron Collider. The Grid computing model is different; a
predecessor to cloud computing, which enables sharing of computing resources across
(virtual) organizations in a fashion similar to cloud computing, but is oriented towards
solving specific computational problems rather than providing a general service [34].
Clarifying the concept and comparing computing resources to cake batter, the grid
can be seen as a whole chocolate cake whereas a cloud can be seen as a plate of
individual brownies. This facilitates understanding that a cloud also can be part
of a grid, which for example has been demonstrated by the CMS experiment. The
computing farm at the experiment, whose nodes are normally used for pre-processing
detector data as the LHC is in operation, can be turned into a cloud which is attached
to the WLCG at times when data is not available [22] (e.g., during large shutdowns).
The reason for this solution is, that the machines are too valuable a resource to leave
partially unused during the time when no data can be taken from the LHC. The
same idea has also been cultivated in the LHCb experiment [16].
Automated monitoring in cloud environments such as the ones discussed above,
3http://clouddocs.web.cern.ch/clouddocs/
6is becoming increasingly more important, as more and more data is starting to
be collected for analytics purposes. The service providers can be interested in
information regarding how their services are used by the users, the cost-effectiveness
of the service, automated scaling based on the usage, automated problem solving
for known occurring issues, or simply gathering statistics that can be provided to
users in order to improve the transparency of the service from a user’s point of
view. Since the amount of data that can be collected from large-scale computing
environments is quite vast, it can also be classified as "Big Data", which the Oxford
English Dictionary [1] explains as data of such a large size, that the handling of that
data is a challenge of its own.
There is also an academic interest in quantifying metrics gathered from cloud
environments. As can be seen in Fig. 1 the amount of articles found in the DBLP
computer science bibliography, which are related to analytics and big data as well as
cloud monitoring has increased steadily since 2009-2010. It can be noted that at the
moment of writing (April 2015) almost three quarters of the data for 2015 is yet to
be produced, thus 2015 was left out. The data was gathered by performing a search,
downloading the results in JSON format, and parsing it through a very simple script.
Five results on cloud monitoring younger than 2009 were related to Meteorology
and thus omitted. The purpose of this figure is to illustrate the rising interest in
monitoring and data gathering in relation to the concept of cloud computing and
large amounts of data.
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Figure 1: Amount of articles found when searching for the terms shown in the plot
legend from the DBLP5 computer science bibliography on 15.04.2015.
5http://dblp.uni-trier.de/
72.1 An introduction to large scale monitoring
The need for monitoring rises from the necessity of being able to determine the
state of a service or hardware that an organization, company or private entity is
maintaining. Whether it be providing a service for a large user community or several
customers, or for personal use, it is essential to understand and be able to discover if
a service is degraded, unresponsive or has other critical issues before the error affects
the user experience. Taking this one step further, monitoring is also an important
part of controlling Service Level Agreements (SLAs) which are part of the Quality
Assurance (QA) process for a service [23]. An SLA is a type of contract between
service providers and service consumers, which explains what the service is supposed
to accomplish for the user (e.g., describing the expected level of availability).
Monitoring can be divided in three stages [81]: data collection, data analysis and
decisions. The three stages can be implemented as automatic or partially automatic
functions which require active human intervention to function. Collection and
analysis can be done by a program that collects information and does the analysis,
for example based on controlling that predifined threshold values are not exceeded.
Decisions or actions can also be programmed, but in several cases the decisions are
made by humans, which are notified by the system as a threshold is breached.
In cases of simple monitoring, the analysis stage can also be done by a human.
One common example is for a user to study the system state using a UNIX tool like
the top task manager. In more complex systems which consist of several thousands
of values and several sensors which measure these values, it can quickly become
difficult to grasp the whole view of a system. In this case it is more efficient to start
oﬄoading the task to a programmatical solution which will alert or alarm a human
when unusual values appear.
Automated monitoring can be done on a small scale using a centralized service
which collects monitoring information from a number of hosts. Modern monitoring
systems are evolving away from centralized solutions as large scale systems become
more common. When monitoring on a large scale, it is important to eliminate single
points of failure, such as those which can exist in a centralized solution. One of the
simplest methods for preparing to scale up is to structure the data collection as a
tree [81]. But, as the scale increases, there will be a need for having several levels in
the tree structure and a need to implement a distributed solution that eliminates
single points of failure.
This has caused peer-to-peer communication to appear as a new medium [81].
One such example is the proof-of-concept monitoring system presented in [51] which
mainly aims to present an example architecture for a peer-to-peer-based monitoring
system. The motivation for exploring peer-to-peer technology is that it can scale
and adapt efficiently, in particular in elastic systems where hosts are spawned and
terminated frequently. The research in [51] shows that the proof-of-concept is able to
scale, but the benchmark is limited to a cloud containing 17 virtual machines (VMs),
which cannot be compared to an infrastructure of thousands of VMs.
There are more complex monitoring systems, for example, HOLMES [76], which
collects metrics, and uses the previously mentioned CEP engine Esper as well as
8machine learning techniques to automatically learn the normal behavior of a cluster.
The aim of HOLMES is to reduce the time that a service responsible spends on
configuring a monitoring tool, by allowing the monitoring tool to identify a baseline
for the monitored machines and alerting human operators when an anomaly is
detected.
One can also findmonitoring systems with self-healing properties, e.g., SHOWA [56].
It is a modular framework that monitors web applications, conducts an analysis
searching for anomalies, and attempts to repair the defect if any is found. The anal-
ysis is based on the idea of correlating the web server response time with degraded
performance. This is done by an anomaly detection module, which can launch a
module for analysing three different types of failures, for example analysing whether
the anomaly affects the performance of the service at all. Taking the self-healing
property one step further, one novel approach, [26], suggests tagging streams of
monitoring data with annotations and using Semantic Web technologies (for reference
see, e.g., [10]) in combination with Stream Reasoning (see, e.g., [80]) for analysing
the flow of monitoring information during certain intervals (i.e., time windows). The
concept of inspecting streams of data is illustrated in Fig. 2. However, this technology
has problems regarding performance and scalability, notably regarding the speed at
which large amounts of data can be analysed [26].
Figure 2: Inspecting a window of diverse streamed (monitoring) data [26].
Monitoring large data streams is by itself not a recently emerged topic. For
example, at CERN, detector data streams of a size of 100 GB/s are not exceptional [2].
Other applications which are known to handle and generate large amounts of data
are large sensor networks, high-frequency trading, and real-time sales analysis [32].
Much academical effort has also been invested in doing research on monitoring (and
anomaly detection) from a computer security point of view, but these themes are out
of the scope for this thesis. Moving from academical research to investigating the
features of four popular monitoring tools: Nagios, Cacti, Zabbix and Ganglia, one
can observe differences in the features they offer, which shows why it is important to
be able to choose the right tool when attempting to monitor a set of machines.
An elementary Nagios installation consists of a monitoring server that performs
checks on a set of machines. A check is a measurement of a define value. The
9monitoring server has configuration files, which for example define the checks to
be performed, the time during which checks are performed, and whom to alert in
case a check has an erroneous value. Configurations can be shared by machine
(through inheritance in the configuration file), which reduces the amount of necessary
configuration. Various plugins and extensions exist due to the large user community.
Since having a single monitoring server is an obstacle for large scale monitoring, there
are Nagios extensions and installation architectures which distribute the monitoring
work among several nodes or create a hierarchy of monitoring servers [81]. As an
example, Yahoo Inc, is listed6 on the Nagios home page having an installations
consisting of 2000 Nagios servers monitoring 100000 hosts and 200000 services.
The Cacti monitoring tool is a graphing tool which mainly is meant for monitoring
network equipment, by using the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [79].
The configuration is done in a web interface containing relevant fields to be filled
in. This can be a tedious and manual task, but templates exist to facilitate the
process. The configuration specifies the data that will be polled for from the device,
and graphed in the Graphical User Interface (GUI) of Cacti. Different notifications
and reports can be constructed and sent to the service responsible using plugins.
It is also possible to use Cacti in a large scale deployment, with the largest known
amount of possible data sources in 2012 being 1 million [70].
Zabbix consists of a complete monitoring system with graphing and notification
capabilities [74]. It can work using remote checks or by having an agent running on
the monitored client. The monitored values can be configured to trigger an action
if they exceed a certain threshold. The thresholds can be set to different levels
of severity with different actions. A properly set up Zabbix installation (e.g using
Zabbix proxies) is capable of operating on a large scale, handling over 9000 readings
per second [24].
Ganglia differs from the three other chosen monitoring tools by more specifically
being a cluster or grid monitoring tool [60], thus aimed at highly distributed systems,
and by originating from an academic environment; the University of California,
Berkeley. It is made for monitoring large-scale environments consisting of several
clusters, with an ability to handle clusters containing over 2000 nodes [78]. The
early idea was a monitoring tool for a single cluster, but it later transformed to cover
computing grids and other models for distributed computing.
These four tools are among the older and traditionally used monitoring tools.
For an extensive survey the reader is advised to study [81], which also presents
a taxonomy for monitoring tools that can be seen in Appendix A. As can be
concluded, the term "monitoring tool" is used in a fairly general manner, including
full-featured tools which provide functionality for many different stages of monitoring
(e.g., collecting, analysing, decisions) or simple tools which cover only one of the
stages. It is also possible to combine several tools which perform individual tasks
to create a customized monitoring infrastructure, and even introduce customized
components such as plugins or software to suit the existing needs. This is one reason
for why monitoring can turn out to be a complex task. As a result, certain tools and
6http://users.nagios.org/directory/Yahoo%2C-Inc/details
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combinations that are observed to work well become popular and emerge as so called
de facto standards.
Figure 3: Google Trends8 analysis in April 2015 for new and old monitoring tools.
One such combination whose popularity has increased steadily is the Elasticsearch,
Logstash, Kibana (ELK) stack that will be presented in detail in Section 3, as it is
partially (but substantially) used in the CERN monitoring infrastructure. A graph
illustrating the rising interest in these three softwares as search terms in Google
Trends as of April 2015 can be seen in Fig. 3. The y − axis on the graph represents
the amount of searches for a specific term in a normalized form as a percentage of the
highest spot on the graph. The point marked ’100’ represents the highest amount of
queries and the legend numbers represent a percentage (i.e., the amount of searches
for ’elasticsearch’ is 35 percent of the amount of searches for ’nagios’ in late 2006).
2.2 CERN IT monitoring in general
The department of IT at CERN is divided in groups, which are divided in sections [30].
The groups are separated based on the different functions and services they maintain
and develop (e.g., storage, databases or datacenter facilities). As an example, the
section for IT Monitoring Management & Tools develops and maintains the general
monitoring infrastructure that is described in Section 3.
In addition to this infrastructure, groups and experiments may have their own
customized monitoring solutions. The reason for this is that the general infrastructure
provides services for monitoring system statistics on a machine level, whereas a group
or experiment may need to monitor specific hardware, for example physical sensors
for measuring a voltage, or a specific service, for example version control services.
The different levels of monitoring at CERN as described previously is illustrated
in Fig. 4. The author has illustrated a rough classification on top of the background
image depicting an aerial view of CERN [18]. The yellow quarter of a ring visible in
the photograph illustrates the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) ring, and three of the
8Data Source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends)
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four LHC experiment sites are shown in the picture (LHCb, ATLAS, ALICE). The
main CERN site in Meyrin, where the datacenter and IT department are located
can be seen to the right of the ATLAS experiment. The remote CERN Prévessin
site can be seen below the LHCb experiment.
Figure 4: A rough classification of monitoring at CERN, drawn upon a photo [18]
by CERN.
The monitoring in A refers to the monitoring infrastructure used in the IT
department and the datacenter which are located physically close to each other
on the main site. This monitoring can be divided in three parts: The LEMON
(LHC Era Monitoring) monitoring infrastructure provided by the monitoring team,
datacenter monitoring solutions, and custom IT monitoring developed in groups at
the IT department. The reason for this grouping is that the datacenter monitoring
may have different requirements for example for monitoring the 100 PB tape storage
[65], compared to monitoring a web service that is provided by a group. One example
of such a project is Metis (the monitoring system for the messaging infrastructure
at CERN) which was discussed in Section 1.2. However, the aim of the LEMON
monitoring infrastructure is to provide a service that limits the need for custom
solutions and implements common monitoring scenarios, which also makes it easier
to share and combine monitoring data between different services [3].
The monitoring in B, experiment monitoring, refers to the various types of
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monitoring that the experiment sites require. The monitoring is a mixture of IT mon-
itoring and monitoring for the experiment infrastructure; such as particle detectors9,
electronic devices, pressure levels, cooling and other relevant measurements. Each of
the four LHC experiment has a small datacenter (computing farm) [2], [12], [28], [67]
on the scale of a few thousand nodes for rapid on-site detector data processing. These
nodes give rise to the need for IT monitoring, for which a monitoring system such as
LEMON or another monitoring software may be used. As an example, the ALICE
experiment has been using LEMON, but has chosen to start using Zabbix10 in 2015
after an evaluation of six monitoring tools [77]. Zabbix is also used for monitoring
systems related to safety at CERN, such as access control for the CERN premises,
servers for surveillance cameras and personnel safety systems [44].
The experiment infrastructure monitoring is similar to the monitoring in C. The
C indicates the monitoring of electronic devices installed in the LHC tunnel. One
example of such a monitoring system is a radiation level monitoring system [73], [82]
consisting of hundreds of radiation measuring devices which the LHC tunnel is
equipped with [68]. This data can be collected for creating real-time dashboards
shown in the control room for the LHC [82]. Another example is monitoring the
various gas delivery systems for the LHC [43], which is done by gas analysis modules
measuring (e.g., the flammability and gas mixture composition), and alarming on
threatening values.
On the experiment site, there is additional monitoring for the detector, which
itself is completely different depending on the site. Monitoring the detector includes
monitoring the state of the hardware and the data quality. For instance, the detector
control system (DCS) in ALICE which controls 18 different detectors with 15000
different nodes (electrical devices and data channels) divided in subsystems and
child-parent hierarchies [21]. The system state is based on threshold logic, one of
the most common monitoring system paradigms [81]. The parts are modeled as
finite state machines (FSM). If a certain amount of child nodes show an erroneous
value, the parent will change its state to an error state. The system presents the
current state on a dashboard as seen in Fig. 5. These dashboards are monitored 24/7
in a control room by trained operators, who will be alerted by an alert system to
investigate the error state.
Out of these three types, this thesis focuses on the first type (A) of monitoring.
The monitoring infrastructure provides services for creating customized sensors for
gathering statistics from a machine. These statistics are automatically transported,
stored and graphed on a dashboard. Several default statistics are also gathered from
the machines without a need for the user to write code for a sensor. These statistics
mainly describe basic CPU, IO, memory and network usage. The infrastructure is
described in detail in Section 3.
9http://home.web.cern.ch/about/how-detector-works
10http://www.zabbix.com/
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Figure 5: A view of the dashboards in the ALICE detector control system [21].
2.3 Business critical IT services at CERN
This thesis work is carried out at the IT-PES (Platform and Engineering Services)
group [31], in the IS (Infrastructure Services) section. The main services that
the group provide for the CERN users include the batch service, version control
systems and issue tracking (e.g., GIT and JIRA), configuration management services
(e.g., Puppet), the BOINC (Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing)
volunteer computing service, and a number of other services managed by three
separate sections. The services are hosted on both physical and virtual machines
(VMs), the choice depends on the service. This thesis will focus on virtual machines,
as the majority of the services concerned run on VMs.
The virtual machines in the CERN cloud infrastructure are OpenStack11 machines
optionally managed by the Puppet12 configuration management software [4]. The
machines are organized in host groups with each host group having a corresponding
configuration file (puppet manifest) or being configured using a parent host group’s
configuration. The host group configuration can be a folder containg other host
group configurations, a file containing the host group’s configuration, or both. The
concept of host groups and configuration files is illustrated in Fig. 6. To facilitate
the configuration of the notification aggregation framework that is described in this
thesis, the framework configuration files for each host group are also grouped in the
11https://www.openstack.org/
12https://puppetlabs.com/
14
same manner.
Figure 6: The host group is the parent of the subhost group.
2.4 Use cases and needs
Service monitoring at CERN is important not only for ensuring that the users
are able to benefit from a service that works as expected, but also for identifying
possible performance issues and optimizations such as bottlenecks, and for accounting
purposes [4]. Efficient storage, data extraction (e.g., performing a search), and data
graphing abilities are helpful for these tasks. Previously, it was difficult to use the
data gathered from the LEMON monitoring tools, since data was stored in separate
storages and highly customized code was necessary for accessing this data. Resource
accounting data was available for certain services, whereas other services required
several different data gathering tools [4]. To improve the situation, a new architecture
for the monitoring infrastructure was designed and implemented, which consists of a
unified storage for monitoring data, a search feature, data graphing features, and
an automated alert and ticket creation system. This architecture is described in
Section 3.
One issue that can be identified in the architecture, is that a service which is
hosted in a large host group can give rise to several alerts and tickets, which in
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turn will create a storm of e-mails and an overflow of information for the service
responsibles, in addition to communication from users, who express their concerns
when the service does not work. Important time that could be spent solving the
problem has to be used for updating the users and analysing new e-mails or tickets.
The same issue is present in monitoring that is based on cronjobs which send alerting
e-mails as they fail. These scenarios are not uncommon at the appearance of an
issue. One possible solution is to shut off the alarms while resolving the issue, and
re-enable them later, but this imposes a certain risk. It is also a concern that
service responsibles will start ignoring every notification in case most of them are
unimportant. Theoretical findings showing this phenomenon has been seen in the
case of [69], a study on human behavior and information overload.
A need to dampen unimportant notification and rise awareness of important
notifications was soon identified when defining the use cases for the monitoring
framework described in this thesis. The first attempt at a solution, by the author,
was to investigate the existing monitoring framework and look for tools that could
fulfill this task. After an initial analysis, it was found that an aggregated view of the
data is available, but only by visiting a dashboard, manually creating the aggregation
by querying the data in the dashboard, and visually analysing the generated graphs
in search for anomalies or warnings.
A larger investigation was undertaken by the author, to identify tools that
automatically could analyse the same data that the monitoring framework was
storing, and rise an alarm in case a serious issue had happened (e.g., several hosts in
the same host group going down). One of the promising candidates was the Riemann
monitoring tool13 that is able to aggregate data from several machines and send
notifications by e-mail if errors are encountered. Another issue was log analysis,
which is often done manually as the service responsible has discovered that there is a
problem in some service. One idea was to filter such logs (e.g., Apache web server
logs) using Logstash14, which had the added benefit of being compatible with the
Riemann monitoring and alerting tool.
Theoretically, using these tools, it would be possible to identify certain types
of log messages, which indicate problems, that would trigger an alert in Riemann.
Doing only this, log file parsing and alerting, is possible in the existing framework, for
example by creating a sensor script for the parsing, and enabling an alert. However,
there are downsides to this approach. First, there is currently no direct way of
automatically aggregating notification information in real-time (from a users point
of view) from several different machines. It can be done afterwards, by manually
creating a query that searches for the wanted notification in a specified set of machines
and draws a graph, but this is not that useful, since the error has been detected at
that point and a certain amount of notifications have been dispatched. Secondly, to
create a sensor, it is necessary to write a script, test it, and maintain it during its
lifetime in order for the notifications to work properly. This can be an error-prone
and time-consuming task. Having tools that automatically would give the same end
results as these two steps, would be very beneficial.
13http://riemann.io/
14http://logstash.net/
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Still, introducing new tools have downsides such as the effort necessary to install,
configure, integrate, and maintain them. This can, however, be a more straightforward
solution with long-time stability if the tools are chosen with care and properly
configured, compared to software development from scratch. But, a disadvantage
is that the tools might contain unnecessary or duplicate features compared to the
existing framework, whereas a highly customizable script may be able to do what is
needed and nothing more. These were some points that were considered before the
final decisions considering the chosen solution.
The final solution was to create a light Python-based framework to solve the
task. The reason for this was that a small, well-developed and suitably customized
framework brings less of a maintenance overhead, than creating a small cluster of
VMs on which the new monitoring tools would be installed. The VMs would not
only need maintenance and quota, the software itself would also need to be upgraded
and configured with regular intervals. The framework would tap into the stream of
notifications as they are collected from all machines to one queue that sends them to
storage. As this stream contains every notification, it would be fairly easy to collect
the relevant notifications for an aggregated view, and notify the service responsible
by a chosen mean. The benefits of this solution are that it is easily integrable to
the existing framework, customizable in a desired way, and the development process
can be steered by requirement. A more in-depth description of the architecture and
implementation of this framework is found in Section 4.
Before the development work started, two main use cases were identified: using
such a framework for monitoring a small service (e.g., GIT) where one notification
may mean that the whole service is down, and monitoring a large service (e.g.,
the batch system15) where a ’high load’ notification may mean that the service is
operating normally, but for certain machines that the service is degraded or inefficient.
After discussion, the latter case was chosen to be investigated initially. The reason for
this was that a large environment produces more noise (uninteresting notifications)
and thus proves to be more suitable for testing purposes. After investigating the
fundamental needs that a service responsible may experience while maintaining a
service, the most important use cases and needs that the framework would help solve
were identified as described in the list below:
• To know the service status:
– This can be done by configuring limits for when a service is degraded.
– It is better to be able to warn users about service degradation, rather
than receiving complaints and then discovering the degradation.
• To suppress unimportant alarms without turning them off:
– By configuring a threshold for sending, e.g., 5 of the same alarms/hour.
• To inform users/service responsibles of service degradation:
15http://information-technology.web.cern.ch/services/batch
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– It could be done by opening or automatically responding to a ticket.
• To automatically close tickets when the alarm is resolved.
• To try to pinpoint or give a hint about the reason for failure:
– For example by defining a log file that a grep command would be executed
on, on a machine.
One concrete example are notifications which do not open tickets, since they
are insignificant by themselves, but a large amount of these exceptions in several
machines require an action. This can for example happen if the notification metric
measures a version of a certain software and all machines are not updated at the
same point or the update is not completed. In that case an aggregated view and
an e-mail which is sent to the service responsible can be useful. However, these
notifications are fairly rare in the monitoring framework.
A short analysis of the found use cases and the objectives was performed. Among
the conclusions are, that the framework should be configurable to hold a value of
what the definition of service availability is (e.g., percentage of machines required to
barely run a service). For a service responsible, it is important to be alerted about
errors before the user complains. One of the main features, as mentioned before, is
to filter away redundant information being careful that any important alert is not
missed. It would also be beneficial to be able to automatically update several tickets
with relevant information, or mark them as resolved, letting users or watchers know
that the error is recognized without spending human time on such communication.
Finally, the service responsible could define a command or action as an attempt to
automatically correct the error. This would be beneficial in cases where a known
error can appear and a known solution can be applied. Ideally, this framework would
fit in a niche of the existing framework where it could reduce the time that is spent
on repetitive tasks and on analysing information that contains an abundance of noise.
18
3 The CERN IT monitoring infrastructure
This Section describes the architecture and components of the CERN IT monitoring
infrastructure. At CERN, the main software infrastructure for monitoring is provided,
maintained and developed by the monitoring group (IT-MON). Information is
collected, processed, stored and published by a framework consisting of different
softwares which are responsible for their own distinct part of the design [3]. As a
comparison, the old architecture of the monitoring infrastructure is illustrated in
Fig. 7, and the current architecture is illustrated in Fig. 8.
Two important parts of the monitoring infrastructure are the LEMON (hereafter
Lemon) monitoring tool and the General Notification Infrastructure (GNI) (described
in Section 3.5) for handling notifications, which can be seen as a part of the monitoring
tool. Lemon was created and deployed at CERN at the start of the new millenium [4].
The logo, whose design is closely related to the tool name, is depicted in Fig. 9.
As a clarification, the term "Lemon monitoring framework", when used in this
thesis, comprises both software that includes the actual Lemon monitoring software
(e.g., lemon-agent), and other software that has been added later such as the
Kibana dashboard which by itself is not connected to the original Lemon monitoring
framework in any way. This reflects how the term "Lemon monitoring framework" is
commonly used, and is distinct from the term "monitoring framework", which in
this thesis describes the new framework that the author developed.
Figure 7: The old Lemon monitoring system architecture [58].
Originally, the Lemon monitoring framework had custom-built components for
handling visualization and the storage was a database, this can be seen in Fig. 7 as a
comparison to the current architecture. It is important to recognize the components
in the old version, since some of them continue to be used, with CERN having around
15 years of experience using that component. Most notably the "Node Monitoring"
component containing the monitoring agent remains in use. The visualisation (Lemon-
Web) and storage (Measurement Repository) have been upgraded to other improved
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solutions. The user interfaces Lemon CLI and Lemon-host-check are still available
and commonly used when testing a newly created sensor. Nowadays there is a Python
API (and Perl API) for developing sensors, whereas before the official APIs were
C/C++ and Perl [58]. It is worth noting that the concept of notifications also have
been part of the old Lemon monitoring tool, even if they are not depicted, but the
implementation has changed over the years.
Figure 8: The existing monitoring infrastructure architecture [29].
Since the first release, the framework has been extensively updated, changed and
expanded. The latest major architectural change started in the early 2010s [3], which
is the currently used architecture. The reason for changing the architecture, was not
only to update the Lemon monitoring framework, but also an attempt to exchange
independent (but similar) monitoring softwares that were used for one single tool [3].
In that case it would be easier to share monitoring data, perform comparisons of
different systems, and as a whole take a step towards unifying the infrastructure
in order to gain a better overview of resources. Below follows a list of components
and softwares that are currently used in the Lemon monitoring framework ([3], [58])
which will be described in turn in this section.
• Metric Manager
– A web interface for defining metrics.
• Lemon Agent
– A software that runs on the monitored machine gathering readings.
• Lemon Forwarder
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– A software that runs on the monitored machine, processing readings from
the Lemon Agent and sending messages to the Messaging System.
• Flume
– Transports the samples from the Lemon Agent to their destinations.
• Hadoop HDFS
– The storage for the metric and notification data.
• Elasticsearch
– A full-text search engine for the metrics and notifications.
• Kibana
– A dashboard for visualizing the metrics and notifications.
• Service Now (SNOW)
– A service management/ticketing system.
The Lemon monitoring framework is based on sensors which measure one or
more metric. More specifically, a sensor consists of metrics (which implement metric
classes). This is illustrated in Fig. 10. The monitoring is done by the lemon-agent
software which runs in every machine that is monitored [58]. It communicates with
the sensors using a protocol that was specifically created for this purpose16. An
entity which produces monitoring data (i.e., a machine) is called a Lemon Producer.
The Lemon Forwarder is a component that processes messages with metrics from
the Lemon Agent, and decides whether to create a notification or not.
Figure 9: The characteristic logo of the Lemon monitoring system [17].
A sensor is a Perl or Python script that implements one or more metric classes
which calculate or read some value that one wishes to measure [58]. Each sensor is a
separate process. The measurement is recorded by the monitoring framework using
functions imported from the Lemon programming library (module) that are called
upon inside the metric script. The measurement frequency is decided by the creator
of the metric. Some other parameters that can be set when creating the metric are
seen in the Metric manager screenshot in Fig. 11. Each metric is associated with
a unique numeric metric ID. There are both standard and custom sensors. The
standard sensors are managed by the monitoring team, whereas custom sensors are
developed by users of the monitoring infrastructure.
16http://lemon.web.cern.ch/lemon/doc/sensorAPI.pdf
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Figure 10: Workflow for creating a metric.
A notification is special kind of metric. It contains a state, e.g., open, active,
or close which reflect the lifetime of the notification. It monitors values of other
metrics. An arbitrary amount of metric IDs to monitor and thresholds for their
values can be defined. When the value that is defined as the threshold is exceeded
as many times as the metric creator has defined, a notification is sent. Optionally
a ticket can be set to open as the limit is exceeded. The workflow for creating a
metric and notification that the user or service responsible is required to follow is
shown in Fig. 10. Basic metrics exist for reuse, but customized metrics have to be
created for many services. This can be compared to the similar workflow for the
monitoring tools described in Section 2.1 where the users can use either a template
or a pre-made plugin for monitoring, or alternatively create their own.
The Lemon monitoring framework collects, transports and filters data through
various software before it reaches the final destination - graphs and numeric values
on a dashboard. Metrics and notifications are transported and handled in different
manners. Sections 3.1 to 3.4 discuss the transport, storage, processing and publishing
of metric data, whereas the last section, Section 3.5, presents how notifications are
handled as a comparison to metrics, since only some steps in the procedures are
shared between metrics and notifications.
3.1 Data sources and transport
Apache Flume is used as the transport medium for the metric values [3]. It is a Java
software for distributed gathering and aggregation for extensive volumes of data that
is sent in streams (e.g., log data). It is based on the concepts "source", "channel" and
"sink" which are contained in an "agent" [39]. The received data is called "events".
A source is a consumer component to which data is sent. One example is the exec
source that executes an arbitrary command and collects the output data, or a server
port whose traffic is collected. In the case of Lemon metrics, a Directory Queue and
rsyslog are the two used sources.
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Figure 11: Part of the Monitoring group’s Metric manager web interface where the
user can define a metric [75].
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The Directory Queue17 is a locally stored queue to which the lemon-producer
(metrics or notification producer) writes messages18. The second source, rsyslog19,
is a software implementation of the syslog protocol (RFC 5424) for transmitting
messages containing log information. Syslog has existed since the 1980s [52], but has
been used as a de facto standard until the first standardization in 2001 (RFC 3164).
Flume is thus configured to listen for and subsequently capture messages which are
either appearing in the Directory Queue or sent out by rsyslog. The channel is an
intermediate temporary storage for the events (messages). The sink reads the events
from the channel and forwards them to an endpoint.
In this case an Apache Avro sink is used to forward the events to a central gateway
instance for final storage. The information is sent to a cluster of ten nodes that
forwards the information to a third layer which is the storage. Apache Avro20 is a
software for data serialization based on schemas that are applied to read and written
data. This minimises the need for processing and storage, as the schemas can be
used instead of appending tags or other information to the log data.
3.2 Data storage
The following section provides a description of where the information from the
monitoring framework is to be stored. As can be seen in Fig. 8, every Lemon
Producer generates measurement samples which are sent using Flume to be stored
both in an ElasticSearch cluster and a Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS) [3].
Hadoop is a distributed framework for processing enormous data sets21. As the
abbreviation reveals, HDFS [13] is a distributed and highly scalable file system.
It consists of a NameNode (master node) which controls the storage and several
Datanodes (slave nodes). The NameNode is responsible for splitting data and
organizing the distribution of the data pieces. Each piece has a configurable number
of replicas stored, to ensure that data can be restored even if a part of the storage
system fails. HDFS also has a rack awareness feature which for example can be
used for storing replicas in different racks. The Lemon monitoring framework uses
a 500 TB part of a HDFS which is part of a larger Hadoop cluster [3]. This is the
data archive, the final data storage destination.
The data is also stored in an ElasticSearch cluster that is available throughout
CERN. Here the metric data is stored only for 30 days. ElasticSearch is a searchable
document storage with analytics features based on the Apache Lucene search library
[49]. Given a document encoded in JSON (JavaScript Object Notation), ElasticSearch
can index and store the detected keys, making the document searchable. An example
is presented in Fig. 12, where the index is the first row, logstash-2015.02.17.
The figure contains a notification that has been read from the message queue and
processed by the authors installation of Logstash (a software similar to Flume for
17http://lemon.web.cern.ch/lemon/projects/dirq-consumer/
18http://lemon-monitoring.web.cern.ch/lemon_producer_configuration
19http://www.rsyslog.com/
20https://avro.apache.org/docs/current/
21https://hadoop.apache.org/
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automatic processing, tagging, and sending of log files) and stored in ElasticSearch.
As can be seen, ElasticSearch has received and identified the JSON structure, and
created a timestamped index. This index can be used for example for searching by
host group name, data aggregation by a specific notification state, time-based queries
or application-specific queries and correlations, in case several applications store data
with different indices.
The data from ElasticSearch can be queried over HTTP using a REST API. The
Lemon monitoring system users have access to the metric and notification data by a
graphical interface, Kibana, presented in Section 3.4. It is not possible to configure
customised indices, since this would require administrator access to the installation.
Users at CERN are currently recommended to launch an own minimal ElasticSearch
cluster (1 master and 3 data nodes) for customised use of either monitoring data or
log files which contain sensitive data (e.g., access logs), since the common dashboard
data is visible inside the CERN network. Detailed instructions for this procedure
exist22. In that way, it is possible for users to create their own solutions for analysing
monitoring data.
As a comparison to the HDFS storage, the monitoring infrastructure’s Elastic-
Search cluster consists of ten nodes, of which one is the master node, one is the
search node, and eight are the data nodes [3]. This installation uses indices which
are separated by date, as seen in the index in Fig. 12.
"logstash -2015.02.17": {
"mappings ": {
...
"notification ": {
"properties ": {
"hostgroup ": { ... },
"metric_id ": { ... },
"metric_name ": { ... },
"snow_assignment_level ": { ... },
"state": { ... }
}
...
}
Figure 12: An example of a JSON-encoded index in ElasticSearch.
The storage model which is implemented in the Lemon monitoring system ar-
chitecture can be compared to the Lambda architecture [59] for handling Big Data,
originating from Nathan Marz a few years back. In fact, a presentation in late April
2015 [6] revealed this architecture to be the inspiration for the design of the current
monitoring infrastructure. The Lambda architecture proposes the use of a separate
batch storage for archival and a separate storage for analytics purposes. The batch
22https://itmon.web.cern.ch/itmon/recipes/elasticsearch_and_kibana_a_basic_
setup.html
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storage is permanent, and can produce output that is based on the full, organized,
amount of data that stems from a certain point in time. The analytics storage is
meant to provide fast access to new data, whereas the results or conclusions may not
be as accurate due to the fact that the data may only be a partial view of a situation.
In this case the batch storage represents the HDFS cluster, and the analytics storage
represents the ElasticSearch cluster.
3.3 Data processing
In this section the data processing in the existing monitoring system is briefly
discussed. Currently, the data that is gathered by the monitoring system is mostly
processed only by ElasticSearch queries. The query is written in the Apache Lucene
query language, which, by the authors experience, can prove to be a usability issue
for an average user. As a solution to this, many basic dashboards which present
monitoring data have been made available by the monitoring team. The future
plans of the monitoring team include integrating a data processing engine, such as
Apache Storm23, notably for metrics aggregation and use cases involving machine
learning [3].
At the moment, one significant component in the GNI that will be presented
in Section 3.5 processes one type of notifications (no_contact) which indicate that
contact has been lost with a machine [33]. These notifications are very important,
since they can indicate that a service or a part of the infrastructure is not functional.
However, this is done by an individual software component that does not have the
power of a data processing engine behind it. This thesis work, which involves creating
a framework for processing the notifications acting as a filter, can be seen as a similar
individual architectural component. Possibly, it can prove to be a useful initial case
study for future work regarding the processing of monitoring data.
3.4 Data publishing
This section explains how the metric data is published in the Lemon monitoring
framework. As can be observed from Fig. 8, the logs, metrics, and alarms (notifica-
tions) are stored in ElasticSearch and published in Kibana. Kibana is a frontend for
ElasticSearch that provides dashboards and analytics functionality which is designed
to work based on indexed ElasticSearch data. The data can be plotted over a timeline
since it contains timestamps, and it is possible to construct a dashboard with plots
simply by clicking, querying, and selecting the relevant data [3]. Writing the query
is likely to be the most difficult step. The Kibana installation at CERN allows for
permanent custom dashboards upon request, and users can freely create temporary
dashboards. As will be discussed in the following subsection, notification data will
not only be available on the dashboards, but can also trigger the creation of a ticket,
which results in an e-mail being sent to the service responsible, or since April 2015,
simply an e-mail alert.
23https://storm.apache.org/
26
Finally, it can be noted that during the course of this thesis work, changes were
happening in the ElasticSearch and Kibana projects. Most notably the company
behind these softwares changed the name from ElasticSearch to Elastic performed a
rebrand in March 201524. In addition to this, new versions of both ElasticSearch and
Kibana were released. Different versions of Kibana require a specific ElasticSearch
version to be installed on all nodes in the cluster. If even one machine with a different
version joins the cluster, Kibana will show an error message indicating this and
not work as expected25. This was the case for the author, as the new beta version
of Kibana 4 was tested in a small ElasticSearch installation. In the new version,
Kibana 4, it is possible to create a more versatile set of visualizations, and a step-by-
step functionality for creating graphs was introduced (as opposed to writing a query
and saving the resulting graph). In April 2015, the CERN monitoring infrastructure
uses Kibana 3 for visualisation, and is evaluating Kibana 4.
One of the large changes between the versions were that Kibana had been
distributed as a plugin to ElasticSearch in previous versions, whereas it now exists
as a separate software. It can also be noted that ElasticSearch does not have any
in-built access control, nor does Kibana. One alternative is the commercial Shield
plugin, offered by Elastic [15]. Another alternative provided by the official Elastic
blog [62] shortly before the Shield plugin was available, is to use a lightweight web
server such as Nginx26 as a proxy for ElasticSearch and Kibana, allowing the web
server to handle the authentication and additional features such as load balancing
and access logs. This was the approach the author used in a test evaluation of
Kibana 4.
3.5 General Notification Infrastructure (GNI)
The GNI is a part of the monitoring infrastructure, and uses data from the Lemon
Producers as is illustrated in Fig. 13. The SCOM (System Center Operations
Manager) producers are Windows servers, which will not be discussed, since the focus
lies on Lemon. The Lemon Producer metrics are processed by the Lemon Forwarder
component [53], as previously mentioned. This component runs in every monitored
machine. It performs an aggregation of the metrics that are measured inside the
machine, in order to decide whether to raise a notification or not. If a notification is
triggered, the forwarder sends it to the messaging system. The aggregation is done
since a notification can be triggered by a combination of metrics.
It is relevant to note that the metric aggregation is performed inside the machine.
As far as the author knows, there is no program available that automatically aggregates
Lemon metric information or notifications, and create an alarm as an informed decision
based on the state of multiple machines. One feature of the Lemon notifications is
that an arbitrary command can be executed on a machine if a notification is raised,
but again, there is no tool that would have a complete view, for example of the state
24https://www.elastic.co/about/press/elasticsearch-changes-name-to-elastic-to-
reflect-wide-adoption-beyond-search
25https://github.com/elastic/kibana/issues/2513
26http://nginx.org/
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of all hosts in a host group, and be able to act based on such information. This is a
challenge that the new framework which will be presented in Section 4 aims to solve.
The messaging system in Fig. 13 consists of ActiveMQ messaging brokers [5].
Apache ActiveMQ is a asynchronous "message-oriented middleware" [72] for enterprise
messaging. The function of enterprise messaging software is to deliver messages, using
message brokers, between different applications, as a mean to provide interoperability,
and to facilitate the integration of softwares in an enterprise environment comprising
a diversity of softwares [72]. In the case of Lemon, the message broker connects the
Lemon Producers (machines) with the GNI dashboard and the SNOW (Service Now)
ticketing system.
The GNI dashboard is similar to the metrics dashboard that was discussed in the
previous subsection. It is also a searchable Kibana 3 dashboard that shows the total
top count of active notifications per host group, per host, and per notification type
on the front page. Similarly, one can search for notifications and graph the amount
of notifications for a certain time interval. SNOW [71] is a incident management
system used at CERN. The incidents are managed as tickets which contain relevant
information such as the caller name, a timestamp, the functional element (FE) that is
concerned, the location, etc. As an important definition, an FE is a group of persons
which are responsible for a certain service, and the FE also has its own e-mail list
containing these persons. Most services are managed with the help of these tickets,
ranging from requesting a parking permit to reporting a computer security incident.
The ticketing system is also accesible by an API allowing the SNOW publisher to
optionally open a ticket for reporting a failure, in case a notification is activated.
As a final part of the GNI, the No contact processor is presented. It is a
component that analyses if the metric readouts are timing out, which can indicate that
there is a problem with a machine [33]. If the machine is unresponsive for a distressing
amount of time, the No contact processor will create a SNOW ticket assigned to the
operator on duty at the computer center. The ticket can be automatically closed by
the processor if it observes that the machine has come online again after a moment.
Eliminating false positives can be difficult, since some nodes, for example in the
batch system, can be under a temporary high load, not having enough resources to
send a metric readout but still not having a problem.
With this as a background, it was found that a way of aggregating notification
information from a group of machines could be done by developing a framework
which will be described in Section 4. During discussions with the involved teams,
it was found that there already had been ideas to develop a framework similar to
this. It was also deemed to be easier to integrate a custom-built framework with the
existing monitoring system, than choosing, installing, and maintaining a software
that would duplicate many of the features that already exist in the monitoring system
in addition to aggregating notifications. The placement of the framework in relation
to the existing infrastructure can be seen in Fig. 13. It would be a component similar
to the No contact processor, since both components read notifications from the MQ,
processes them, and re-emits notifications into the messaging system which end up
on the dashboard or in the SNOW ticketing system.
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Figure 13: The GNI architecture [33] with the "Monitoring framework" component
added on the left.
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4 Expanding the existing monitoring infrastructure
This section illustrates how the information collected by the Lemon monitoring
framework has been taken advantage of to create a framework for aggregating
notification data from several hosts. The first subsection shows the architecture of
the new framework, the second subsection presents the logic behind the configuration
files that the framework uses, the third and last subsection described how data is
stored and processed in the framework. Each subsection presents new technologies
in relation to how they have been used, often with a comparison as a motivation as
to why certain choises were made.
The current monitoring infrastructure was presented in Section 3, and it was
found that there is a shortcoming regarding the aggregation of data on a larger scale
(e.g., per host group) as opposed to per machine before a notification is created. As
far as the author investigated, there were no tools available at CERN for this task
that would do any kind of basic analysis in real time and create an alert that would be
triggered upon reception of notifications from several machines. This was the reason
to investigate possible solutions, which resulted in the creation of this framework.
As had been observed in Section 2.4, this framework was designed and implemented
to automatically handle unimportant notifications and raise awareness of large-scale
failures. The objective was to make it easy to configure which notifications and host
groups are important, and to whom the notifications are to be sent.
4.1 Architecture of the new framework
The framework itself is divided in roughly ten separate scripts containing classes.
The main parts can be seen in Fig. 14 which shows the main scripts and folders as
well as explanations for each component. It is developed in and for Python (version
2.6.6) as this is the version that is available in the installations of Scientific Linux
Cern 6 (SLC6) which at the moment of writing is running on the majority of the
machines this thesis work considers. The logic for consuming notification messages
from the message queue uses the twisted_consumer.py proof of concept Consumer
class27, created by a colleague, with some customization done for the sake of the
framework.
As seen in Fig. 14 the framework consists of five core parts which are marked in red
(main, actions, database, config and logger). The actions that are launched
from the actions script are defined in their own scripts, as an example openstack
and send_mail are shown (marked in light red). The configuration files are stored
in their own folder, yamlconf, marked in blue. The framework also contains unit
tests (marked in green).
The basic unit that is handled in the framework is a message, which is parsed from
the body and headers of the message that is received from the MQ. In general there
are a total of between 400–600 active notification messages of different importance
(also from different host groups) arriving per minute. This was measured simply
by counting the messages in a function as part of the framework and logging this
27https://github.com/gmccance/twisted-gni/
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Figure 14: The main parts of the framework architecture.
information as the framework was running. Of these, tens of alarms (per minute)
belong to the host groups that are under investigation in this thesis work. This,
again, is based on information extracted from the log files.
The program flow of the framework is presented in Fig. 15, which shows the differ-
ent stages of how a MQmessage is handled in the framework. In short, important fields
from the MQ message is parsed to form a message, which is stored. The policies are in-
spected, which may or may not trigger a notification. The message contains the follow-
ing fields: header_timestamp, body_timestamp, value, metric_id, entity,
description, environment, hostgroup and fe_name. The field entity is the
hostname, and the field environment describes whether the machine is part of the
production or development enviroment. These message units are used for storing the
relevant information into a local database and for passing the relevant information
from a MQ message to an action. As can be seen, the messages contain the host
group names and can thus be mapped to a policy.
If there is a policy for an exact host group, it is examined to determine whether
it should trigger or not. Currently the specifications of the framework contain two
types of policies; number and fraction. The number policy simply counts the number
of machines with notifications in the host group and compares it with the threshold.
The fraction policy counts the number of machines with notifications and compares
it with the total amount of machines in that host group. In this case the threshold
acts as a percentage. This can be especially useful in environments with a large
amount of machines where, for example, having 90 percent or more of the machines
running is considered to be a sufficient service level.
The framework will also match the host group in the notification against policies
for upper level host groups (parent host groups). The reason for this is that a parent
host group counts notifications from its subhost groups. I.e., a notification from
host groups such as zone5/important/computing or zone5/important/idle may
also be counted in a policy for the host group zone5/important. This means that
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several policies can trigger an action upon reception of one message. At the moment
of writing, the framework will execute all triggered actions, since that was a request
from the users, but as seen in Fig. 15, one way to decide which policy would be
preferred, would be to always choose the longest matching policy. However, this can
lead to conflicts if, say, one policy wishes to restart a certain software and another
policy wishes to restart the whole machine. This, and other related risks that need
to be accounted for in the framework, are discussed in Section 6.4.
When the policies to trigger have been collected, the framework executes the
configured action(s). These actions are described in more detail in Section 5. After
this, the framework processes the next notification that has arrived and goes through
the same process. This will go on until the framework is closed down, after which
it is possible to restart the framework and load the latest state that the framework
was in, or to start counting the aggregated notifications from zero. As part of the
specifications imposed on the framework, the notifications are only removed from the
error dictionary when the framework receives a message saying that the notification
is closed. The count is, e.g., not zeroed when a threshold is reached.
4.2 Configuration files
The configuration files for the framework are written in YAML [9]. An example of a
configuration file can be seen in Section 5, Fig. 18, where the configuration is used
to illustrate the how the actions work. The layout of the configuration file and the
choice to use YAML was made, since the majority of VMs at the department of IT
have their configuration managed by Puppet as explained in Section 2.3, and it was
deemed to be a good choice from a usability point of view, to have both types of
configuration files follow the same logic and format. Thus, the configuration files are
stored in folders named by the parent host group, and the configuration file name
is the subhost group name. This idea was previously illustrated in Fig. 6 which
describes the relation between host groups and subhost groups.
Some issues that might arise from this choice are, that it can be complicated to
manually create these configuration files, the correct folder, and to ensure that the
configuration is correct, parsable and so on. To solve such issues, it is part of the
future work to create a short script that would check the configuration file for errors
or syntax mistakes, or even a tool for automatically creating these configuration files
if there is a need for it.
The configuration file must contain at least the following information: the host
group name on the first row, the type of policy which is used and one or more triggers
(actions). It can also be specified which types of exceptions to include or exclude
when counting. Regarding the host group name, it is important to not add the
parent host group names, i.e., the full path on the first row. This is an example of a
misconfiguration that is currently difficult to spot and which goes undetected in the
framework until the service responsible starts wondering why no notifications are
collected from this certain host group. However, some of the large benefits with the
configuration files are that they are written in a format that is familiar for most of
the personnel, and easily can be changed and added as necessary.
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4.3 Storage and processing of data
As messages arrive to the framework, they are parsed and put in a Python dictionary
of the format that can be seen in Fig. 16. The figure shows the structure of the error
dictionary that contains the received notifications and the policy dictionary that
contains information parsed from the configuration files. The fields that were chosen
as relevant to store are parsed into a message, from the message that is received
from the message queue. This parsed message is stored in a local SQLite28 database
as a table row with columns and values as described in Fig. 17.
1 {hostgroup{error:set([ machine ])}}
The error dictionary.
1 {hostgroup{
2 exceptions :{’include ’:set([ include]),
3 ’exclude ’:set([ exclude ])},
4 policy:’number ’ OR ’fraction ’
5 triggers :{
6 email:{ number:n, threshold:t}
7 snow: {fe: f, threshold: t}
8 cmd: {do: script , threshold: t}
9 }
10 }}
The policy dictionary.
Figure 16: The error and policy dictionary structures.
{’body_timestamp ’: 1425993887 ,
’description ’: u’exception.ipmi_wrong ’,
’entity ’: u’lxbsu0625 ’,
’environment ’: u’production ’,
’fe_name ’: u’LXBATCH ’,
’hostgroup ’: u’batchsystem/batch/gridworker/aishare/share ’,
’header_timestamp ’: u’1425993894 ’ ,
’metric_id ’: 30540
’value ’: 5}
Figure 17: In this dictionary which represents data parsed from a MQ message, the
keys represent database table column names, in which the values are stored.
The error dictionary is stored using LevelDB29. LevelDB is a storage engine for
28https://sqlite.org/
29https://code.google.com/p/py-leveldb/
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storing ordered key-value pairs in string format [27]. The notification dictionary
had to be serialized to string format in order to be stored. First, an attempt was
made to store the dictionary in JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) format, which
failed. The reason for this is that the dictionary contains a Set of machines which
are sending notifications, and the conversion for a Set to JSON string is not available
in the Python JSON library [38], unless additional encoding and decoding code is
added. The second attempt was to convert the dictionary to YAML which offers
native support for sets [8]. This conversion was successful, and thus, the dictionary
is stored with the current time (in seconds) as a key, and a YAML encoded string
representing the dictionary as a value.
LevelDB supports fetching of records from a defined range with optional upper
or lower bounds, which, e.g., can be time ranges. This makes it possible to store the
dictionary as the framework is shut down, and resume to the old state immediatly
by reloading the error dictionary from the LevelDB storage. Such a feature is useful
if the framework crashes for some reason (e.g., unexpected power outage) or if it is
closed just before an action would have been triggered. It is also possible to replay
the actions of the framework since the actions (including a timestamp) are stored in
log files, and the notifications are stored in LevelDB. Taking it one step further, it
would be possible to create simulations of how different configurations would react
with different message flows based on the existing components in the framework.
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5 Framework actions
This section presents the actions that the framework is capable of performing after a
policy has been triggered as previously described. The actions are configurable in
the host group configuration file, and in the case that two overlapping policies are
triggered, both actions are executed. This could cause issues, but it was a conscious
choice to do so for now, based on discussions with the future users.
When an action is triggered, the framework calls a function with the following
information:
• Exception name.
• Policy (a dictionary containing the whole policy).
• Message (a dictionary containing the parsed MQ message).
The function executes as a separate process using the multiprocessing module.
The process terminates as the action returns from being executed and the program
ends. If the process execution hangs for some reason, there exists a possibility, that
the computer where the framework is running will start to contain zombie actions
that are not terminated. In this case it would be beneficial to set a time limit for how
long an action is allowed to run, and run a cleanup process with a certain interval
that would kill processes which have been left hanging for longer than the defined
time limit allows.
There also needs to be a limit on the amount of actions the framework can take.
The following two limits were considered: a limit for actions the framework can launch
during a certain time interval or a limit for the actions per host group. It was decided
to start with inserting a limit per host group, deciding how long the framework has
to wait before being able to launch a new action. This is the "cooldown time" for
an action. However, if the child host group has recently executed an action, it is
still possible for the parent host group to execute an action. This logic follows from
the decision that was previously discussed, to allow all actions in policies which are
triggered by a notification to be executed simultaneously on the same host group.
5.1 Shell commands and scripts
The framework supports the execution of shell commands and scripts. The syntax for
this is a trigger name starting with cmd_. An example can be seen in the cmd_ping
trigger in the configuration file shown in Fig. 18, where the command in the do field
pings the host monitoring.cern.ch twice. Such a command can for example be
useful when the framework needs to determine whether the received exceptions are a
result of another service malfunction. As can be seen in the same cmd_ping trigger,
it is also possible to use piped commands.
It is necessary to provide the absolute (full) path to the command, otherwise the
command will not be found. Since any arbirtary command will be accepted, it is also
possible to launch a script that will execute as the threshold is reached. However,
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1 carolinatest:
2 policy: number
3 triggers:
4 email:
5 threshold: 5
6 recipient: carolina.lindqvist@cern.ch
7 snow:
8 threshold: 1000
9 fe: fake_test_functional_element
10
11 cmd_ping: &PING
12 threshold: 33
13 do: /bin/ping -c 2 monitoring.cern.ch | \
14 grep rtt | cut -d / -f5
15
16 cmd_trace: &TRACE
17 threshold: 4
18 do: /bin/traceroute monitoring.cern.ch
19 recipient: carolina.lindqvist@cern.ch
20
21 analysis:
22 threshold: 3
23 tasks:
24 cmd_ping: *PING
25 cmd_trace: *TRACE
26 recipient: carolina.lindqvist@cern.ch
27
28 exceptions:
29 include:
30 - exception.carolina_incl
31 - exception.carolina_ping
32 - exception.carolina_study
33 exclude:
34 - exception.carolina_excl
Figure 18: A sample configuration.
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launching scripts introduces problems such as ensuring that the script is in the
correct place, that the script is executable, and most importantly, that the contents
of the script corresponds to what the person who writes the configuration imagines
the script to contain. This is a possible risk that needs to be kept in mind, even
though it is unlikely to be a severe problem, and this practice is already known, for
example from using cronjobs30. Practical problems such as having to maintain both
the configuration files and the script files that are associated with the configurations
may arise. Long commands and analyses which only fit into scripts should therefore
be avoided, unless they are necessary.
Due to the nature of YAML, it was possible to introduce the analysis trigger.
In YAML it is possible to specify a reference to a previously defined node and use
the reference to indicate the contents of the referenced node. This is described in the
YAML specification Sections 6.9.2 and 7.1 [9]. An example of this referencing can be
seen in Fig. 18 where the rows 11 and 16 contain an "anchor", which is the name
of the reference preceded by an ampersand (&) sign and the "alias" on rows 24-25
where the reference is used, in form of the reference name preceded by an asterisk
(*). As the configuration is loaded, the alias is expanded to contain the node content,
for example row 24 would contain rows 12-14 (not 11).
The analysis trigger takes advantage of the referencing technique by enabling the
combination of several actions to be run. This could, for example, be useful when the
result of single commands are sent to one user, but the result of actions with higher
thresholds are sent to another user. It is also an alternative to have 2-3 commands
combined to an analysis trigger instead of writing and maintaining a script that
would execute several commands and return a parsed output of them.
After any script or command has been executed, the result is returned to the
action script which is responsible for the actions. If there is a recipient e-mail adress
that has been configured for the trigger, the command and the result will be sent to
the recipient along with a timestamp which indicates the time when the e-mail was
dispatched. The subject line contains the timestamp, the host group name, and a tag
surrounded by brackets ([ismon]) for facilitating e-mail filtering. The tag "ismon"
is shorthand for Infrastructure Services MONitoring. In the case that a script or
command hangs, this will not directly influence the framework, since the action
script runs as a separate Python process.
5.2 Creating and modifying service tickets
The commercial SNOW (Service NOW) incident management and ticketing system31
is the main system that is used at CERN for handling incidents and tickets. This
system was described in Section 3.5 as it is one endpoint for the notification infras-
tructure. One of the new features that the framework is planned to be used for is,
automatic opening, editing and closing of SNOW tickets. This feature would save
time, e.g., if there are several tickets that are generated by the same machine in
30http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/cron.8.html
31http://www.servicenow.com/products/it-service-automation-applications/
incident-management.html
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which case these tickets could be aggregated to a single ticket containing all the
notifications that the machine (or machines) were showing.
During the development of the framework it was important to be able to have a
test environment where multiple incidents could be created and viewed. It was not
feasible to use a real functional element, e.g., inside the section, since any test tickets
would be sent to the several persons that belong to the functional element’s mailing
list. Instead, the possibility to use a test instance that would be provided by the
SNOW team was investigated. This posed a small challenge, since the access to the
ticket creation API had to be justified and discussed, which had to be done not only
with the SNOW team, but also with the monitoring team, since this work is based
on their infrastructure. As a reminder, as was seen in Fig. 13, the infrastructure
contains a SNOW publisher component which reads notifications and opens tickets
if it is necessary.
One suggestion from the monitoring team was, to reuse the SNOW publisher
component and simply create a new notification (based on the aggregated information)
in the framework, and submit it to the MQ broker. Then the broker would submit
the ticket to the GNI dashboard and create a ticket using the SNOW publisher if
it was necessary. This would also solve the testing and access issues, since it could
be confirmed that the ticketing works by examining the GNI dashboard and seeing
the framework’s notification. The author was able to send a test notification that
is created by the framework, written to the queue, and that appears in the Kibana
dashboard. The notification can be seen in Fig. 19. To open a ticket, using the GNI,
it is only required to insert a flag in the notification message (the header.m_snow
field set to 1), and the GNI will open a ticket.
Compared to the existing infrastructure, it is an improvement to be able to
programmatically create new notifications that consist of aggregated data instead
of information from single hosts. What remains to be studied in the future, is to
be able to edit and close tickets. Integrating the framework with SNOW will need
minor changes to be done also on the SNOW side, as well as agreements between all
involved teams on the specifications for the interface, i.e., the meaning of different
fields in the notification, in order for SNOW to be able to parse the notification
properly. The major change is that notifications will not belong to single entities, but
to functional elements (services). Discussing these changes, and implementing them
is a time-consuming task that will be continued after the thesis has been presented.
5.3 OpenStack actions
The infrastructure at CERN was presented in Section 2.3. As was mentioned, the
foundation for the CERN cloud is based on OpenStack, which at CERN is currently
running the Juno (10th) version [14]. The latest (11th) version, Kilo, was released
recently, at the end of April 2015 [37]. The services that the focus lies on are hosted
on OpenStack VMs, and the framework can interface with the OpenStack API, which
is the reason for briefly presenting OpenStack.
OpenStack is essentially a collection of several tools with different purposes, which
each represents a component or service in a computing cloud [35]. The components
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can be combined fairly freely depending on the architecture and purpose of the cloud,
but there exists a set of recommended core services [35] that should be included in a
general cloud architecture. The components are also named in a manner that does
not always reflect their purpose, for example, some of the core services are as follows:
nova (computing), neutron (networking), keystone (identity and authentication)
and horizon (a dashboard). The services are accessible using the dashboard, if that
component is installed, or by a command-line tool that bears the same name as
the component one wishes to use, e.g., nova. The OpenStack components are also
accessible by a Python API, which again, is different for each tool and bears the
name of the tool. As an example, the package python-novaclient can be used to
implement a custom version of the nova tool or, e.g., to programmatically list the
VMs in a hypervisor or start migrating a VM, which is also doable by using the nova
command in the CLI.
It is worth noting that the APIs have been dubbed "The best-kept secret of
OpenStack"32 and the OpenStack development team also notes that the Python API
"has not yet been documented"33. These are practical issues a developer faces as
they wish to programmatically access OpenStack components. Since the CLI tools
themselves are fairly well documented, it is also possible to use a Python library
such as subprocess that is able to run arbitrary CLI commands and instead run a
nova command as a subprocess. The author has subjectively observed that this is a
common shortcut when there is little time for the developer to familiarize themselves
with the OpenStack Python libraries and discover the sometimes undocumented
features, or when it is simply more practical to use subprocesses instead of creating
a dependency on the native library.
In the case of the framework it seemed clearer from an architectural point of view
to use the native library for the actions that involve OpenStack, most notably, for the
action to restart a VM. The author also had some previous experience using the API
which proved to be an advantage, and, additionally, the IT-PES group had already
developed tools and a customized client whose functionality could be inherited in this
project. One of the main advantages from the customized client was the Kerberos
authentication method34 that is not (yet) included in the official OpenStack release.
Kerberos is an authentication service, or more exactly a protocol, whose most
recent version is defined in RFC 4120. The authentication is based on a client,
an authentication server, and a ticket-granting service [64]. The basic idea behind
Kerberos is that a user authenticates once, and receives a special, temporary, and
cryptographically protected ticket that can be used for authentication instead of the
original credential. Some of the main benefits of this are, that the original credential
is passed only once, which reduces the dangers of having it captured by a malicious
user, the ticket can be used for transparent authentication in services which accept
this kind of authentication, and the ticket has an expiration time after which it
cannot be used even if it somehow is captured.
32http://www.ibm.com/developerworks/cloud/library/cl-openstack-pythonapis/
33https://github.com/openstack/python-novaclient
34http://openstack-in-production.blogspot.ch/2014/10/kerberos-and-single-sign-
on-with.html
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The Kerberos support is important for using OpenStack itself, since CERN uses
Kerberos tickets as Single Sign-On (SSO) credentials for OpenStack, which in practice
means that the credentials that are used for interacting with OpenStack are the
same credentials which are used to access all of the main services at CERN (such as
e-mail, administrative services, wiki pages, meeting management, etc.). However,
when accessing OpenStack from the CLI or API, the credentials are usually stored
in cleartext, either in environmental variables or inside a script (openrc.sh) that
places the credentials inside the environmental variables. This is the easiest way to
authenticate [36] which is built in, and as a consequence an often used solution. In
many cases this is a good thing, e.g., for testing out OpenStack or in environments
where the OpenStack credentials are not of significance. But, as explained, SSO
credentials are very significant. Since the main OpenStack installation is accessible
through a common cluster (which can also be logged in to from outside CERN given
that the user is registered at CERN), it is possible for anyone with root access to this
cluster, to malisciously search for and obtain SSO credentials from the environmental
variables. This, and its implications are clearly explained in the user guide for the
cloud service [48] to make users aware of this fact and the associated risks.
The root access is restricted to administrators, but a vulnerability or an inside
attack could potentially leak a user’s password. In any case, an administrator of
a cloud service has no reason to be able to access a credential that can be used
universally. Even worse, if, by human error, an unknowing user stores the password in
cleartext and places the file in a publicly accessible location, e.g., a public repository
or a public storage, it is possible even for unaffiliated persons to obtain a password.
As a solution, it is safer to use the Kerberos authentication method by first requesting
a Kerberos ticket, and subsequently use the ticket to authenticate to OpenStack.
This way there is no need to handle the credentials in cleartext at any point, and
it is one of the commonly used techniques to safely authenticate CERN users and
staff to internal services. For these reasons, it was very beneficial to be able to use
the OpenStack client (novaclient) that is patched with Kerberos support in the
notification aggregation framework.
The OpenStack actions that in general can be imposed on a VM are, for example,
terminating of the VM, creating a VM, rebooting a VM or migrating a VM. The
action that was implemented in the framework is the rebooting action, which can be
useful if a service is malfunctioning and it is known by the service responsible that
restarting the machine (or machines) will remove the problem. It is fairly easy to
extend the framework with further actions. It is only necessary to add a call for the
corresponding function from the novaclient instance with a few lines of wrapper
code that is common for all functions.
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Figure 19: A notification that is sent by the framework to the Kibana dashboard.
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6 Experiments done with the framework
The framework has gone through three quite different types of evaluations which will
be described in this section. The first type is unit testing, which is a fairly common
part of software development. The second type consists of testing the framework
in use on real data, gathering logs of the actions and the received messages, and
analysing these logs to be able to compare the behavior of the framework compared
to the existing infrastructure. The third type of evaluation is an interview that was
conducted with representatives for a both a small and a large distributed service.
The important difference between these two use cases, as discussed before, are that
a large service can ignore certain notifications and a small service need to be more
strict when detecting possible service degradation. In the final phases of the thesis
work, the interview was also extended to a survey that reaches out across several
groups at the CERN IT department which hold similar interest in a framework like
this, such as the monitoring and the cloud infrastructure team. The reason for
choosing interviewing as a method, was to learn how the service responsibles are
using the monitoring tools in practice, and to learn which features are missing, that
the framework could provide. It was also a mean to justify the measured results
from the experimentation, by providing an account of concrete user experiences.
6.1 Unit tests
The framework is tested using unit tests that take advantage of the Python unittest2
module. At the moment the unit tests cover the basic functionality of the main
program: receiving and counting notifications as well as tests for triggering or not
triggering the different actions. The unit tests are set up by calling methods, which
do not correspond to a real scenario when the framework is listening to a message
queue. It would be possible to simulate a real environment for the tests, either by
replaying old traffic using the error dictionaries that are stored in LevelDB as was
conjectured in Section 4.3, or by simulating a message queue that mock messages
would be pushed in to. Either of these were deemed to not be necessary, since the
architecture was deemed to be modular enough for creating tests that test single
funcions instead of a giant test that would simulate a real environment.
The idea of constructing modular and easily testable code is supported by the
fact that test-driven development (TDD) can be used as a tool for guiding the design
and proper refactoring of the software and classes in the right direction [42]. In any
case, it is often helpful to have stable tests, since the developer can know at which
point part of the code breaks, and start debugging from there. Previous studies have
found both positive and contradictory evidence when reviewing the use of TDD, such
as improved code quality but decreased productivity, depending on the context [63].
It can be seen that the project described in [42] has close to a third more lines of test
code than production code, which could indicate decreased productivity. However,
the author explains that there is less of an effort needed when developing test code,
which would indicate that it does not explicitly influence the productivity in this
case.
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During the development of the framework described in this thesis an approach
that mixes TDD with traditional methods was used. A test was usually constructed
before adding any large features, as a design model for the interfaces, but after-
wards more tests were added in case it was found that the old test did not catch
certain errors. The focus was not on rigorous testing, but instead on spending time
developing the framework. Tests were used as a help during development, not as
a tool that dominated the development. The code was also briefly profiled with
the cPython module to gain a quick overview of whether the framework contains
obvious bottlenecks at this stage of development. The results of a single two hour run
can be found in Appendix C. Based on this profiling data, it looks like the SQLite
database library takes most of the time to store messages in the database. At a later
point, the feature of storing messages in SQLite may be removed if it is found to
not be necessary. It is worth noting that the intention of doing the profiling was to
detect if there are any serious problems in the framework, and to see how the load is
divided among the different components of the framework. It was not an extensive
investigation, since this project is limited in terms of time. Also, the framework itself
is not showing bad performance, which makes profiling a low-priority task that was
done simply out of curiosity.
6.2 Testing the framework in use
To investigate the impact of using the aggregation framework as opposed to when
not using the framework, the framework was started and run during a six-day
interval, to illustrate any variations in the traffic over several days. The test was
planned, executed and evaluated based on principles which describe how to conduct
experiments in computer science [83]. The main principles that were used are as
follows: making the test situation as realistic as possible, finding an independent
source for verification, and collecting the results in a reliable manner.
Two features that were looked for in the experiment can be highlighted as a
hypothesis statement for the tests. The first is that the same machine may have
several open notifications, which each will trigger a SNOW ticket, even if there is
only a single cause. The hypothesis in this case is that there are several cases when
a service responsible receives several tickets from the same machine regarding the
same problem, and that the framework would help minimizing the amount of such
cases. One example that was seen when running the framework, was a machine that
was showing a notification for an unsupported configuration and soon after that a
no_contact notification. Using the framework, the service responsible would have
been notified only once instead of twice.
The second idea to be investigated was to consider different tunable parameters
for the framework. The hypothesis was, that the cooldown time and the threshold
limits, are the most tuneable parameters which exist in the framework, and that there
should be visible differences in having long or short cooldown times. The intention
was to investigate the limit for how long the cooldown time can be, before a service
responsible starts losing information. Knowing how to tune the cooldown time is
especially useful in cases where there are sudden bursts of notifications, which may
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be closed in a short time. As a reminder, part of the specification for the framework
is to always keep the amount of received open notifications in memory, and not, for
example, zero the counter as an action is triggered. A notification is removed from
the error dictionary only when the framework receives a message that the notification
is closed. The test would also show if there are notifications which suddenly appear
in large quantities, and therefore either need to be excluded if they are less important,
or if the configuration needs a higher threshold.
Regarding the first experiment principle, being realistic, it was found during
the experimentation phase, that there are certain CERN-developed notifications
which do not give rise to SNOW tickets, that thus had to be excluded from the
notifications that the framework was counting for the threshold. This was done in a
few minutes, by reading the notification name, visiting the Metric Manager portal
(shown in Fig. 11) to investigate whether the notification was set to open a ticket
or not, and finally to enter the name of the notification in the proper host group
configuration file. This cut down the counted amount of notifications from 113 to 1
on a certain host group which had many occurrences of a single notification, even
when running the framework for 10 minutes each time. The notification in question
triggered if there were less than 50 running instances of a certain batch client process,
and the notification’s actuator was set to try to start such a process. To ensure
realistic measured values, all observed notifications which did not create a ticket
were excluded in the above described manner before commencing with the following
measurements. The sole exceptions were cases when these notifications had been
specifically included by the service responsibles when specifying the configuration
files for each host group. As mentioned before, one intention of the experiment was
to single out notifications that can be excluded when tuning the framework.
The independent source that was to be used for cross-checking is the Kibana
dashboard described in Section 3.4 that stores all notifications and allows a user to
perform aggregation of notifications by manual queries. The collection of results was
done by using the log files that the framework writes to. Each triggered action was
noted, as well as the opening and closing time of the notifications. The log files were
used to generate graphs that will be shown, explained, analysed and compared to
results that can be discovered from the Kibana dashboard. During the extraction
of this information from the log files, the author discovered and fixed minor flaws
in the logging, e.g., that the log message for closing a file did not contain the host
group (policy) that was concerned. The message only wrote the notification and
machine name. However, the log files were still usable, since the machine name was
logged when a notification was opened, and it thus was possible to easily deduce
where a machine belonged simply by keeping note of the amount of notifications that
belonged to a machine name.
The Python script that was developed to parse the log files into graphs use
the matplotlib module’s plotting functionality. For the sake of simplicity two
host groups are compared. Host group 1 (HG1) contains rules for including four
notification types. Host group 2 (HG2), a subhost group of HG1, contains rules for
exclusion of eight notification types (thus including the notifications which are not
excluded). The script reads the log file, and creates a point when a notification is
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opened or closed in either of the host groups, or both, since we keep in mind that HG
2 is a subhost group of HG 1. The log files also contain the amount of notifications
that have arrived to each host group. This information is stored each minute in
the logs and is basically a count of the notifications per host group from the error
dictionary (see, e.g., Fig. 16 as a reference for the error dictionary contents). Below
follows five graphs showing different aspects of the notifications that HG 1 and its
subhost group, HG2, received during a six-day interval. All graphs show the same
time interval. The graph data is taken both from Kibana, which is deemed to be the
reliable source, and the framework. One comparison is performed between Kibana
and the framework to motivate that the framework functions correctly.
In Fig. 20 the total amount of active and opened notifications can be seen. The
reader may note that in the current monitoring system, an alert is sent only as
the notification is opened. The messages which state that a notification is active
is simply helpful for knowing that a notification is active, i.e., not closed. In order
to catch notifications which have been opened before the program was started, the
aggregation framework also listens for active notifications. As seen in Fig. 20, the
peak value is between 25000 and 30000 notifications, which may sound alarming.
It is worth noting that this number contains uncritical notifications which do not
create a ticket, and also that the same machine may have several active notifications.
The host group also contains thousands of nodes which reflects in the amount of
notifications. The total amount of notification messages (over 1.7 million) is also
not surprising, since the active notifications are included and the timespan is several
days.
If the active notifications are removed, and only opened notifications are consid-
ered, the graph changes. Roughly 13.000 out of 1.7 million messages represent active
notifications. In percents, this number is around 0.75%. This is illustrated in Fig. 21
with the same data as in Fig. 20, but only showing opened notifications. It can still
be observed that there are over 300 notifications opened at the peak, and four bursts
of more than 100 notifications have been observed during two days in the beginning.
When HG1, the same host group as in the two previously discussed figures, was
observed by the monitoring framework, the result was considerably different. This
can be seen in Fig. 23. There is at most three relevant notifications which according
to the rule for that host group would trigger an alert. The reason for the differences
in the notification peaks (300 vs. 3) can mainly be explained as follows: there are
only four notification types that are considered to be of importance. Even if the
graphed amount of notifications in Fig. 21 would not generate tickets, they can still
be considered to be a kind of noise that needs to be filtered out when inspecting the
graphs in Kibana. The amount of notifications which are opened and create a ticket
are seen in Fig. 22. It can be noted that two notifications account for much of the
opened tickets. Using the framework to automatically filter a certain amount of these
notifications away from the start can be considered to be a significant improvement
to the workflow. And still, the data does not disappear, but will be available in
Kibana if it is necessary to study it at some point.
To confirm that the notification framework would work in a consistent manner, a
comparison was made with the data that is available in Kibana. The author created
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Figure 20: The total amount of active and opened (mostly) uncritical and critical
notifications in Host group 1 as shown in Kibana.
a graph in Kibana, which contains the occurrence of the same four notifications that
the framework observes for HG1. The graph is presented in Fig. 24. The framework
graph, seen in Fig. 23, was created by parsing the log files of the framework, since
at the point the experimentation was done, the framework’s ability to send actual
notifications to Kibana was still under development. The expectation from the
author was, that the graphs would be more or less the same. However, the author
observed three key factors that can be made accountable for the minor, but visible,
differences in Figures 23 and 24. The first remark is that the graph from Kibana
shows only opened notifications, whereas the framework observes both open and
active notifications. This leads to a slightly higher notification count in Fig. 23
around the peak. The reason for not graphing the active notifications in Fig. 24 is
that the same machine could be counted twice, since, to the authors best knowledge,
it is not possible to out of the box create a graph in Kibana 3, which shows a unique
count of a certain field. If both active and opened notifications would be shown, the
graph would thus look completely different and not reflect how many new notifications
have appeared. This is the reason for emphasizing in the figure captions that the
notifications are opened in Fig. 24, and unique active and opened in Fig. 23.
Lastly, the third reason for differences was found to be the binning (value grouping)
of the histogram. The first Kibana graph that the author created was very different,
since the measurements were grouped on a hourly basis. The framework graph
in Fig. 23 is based on physical width, which made it difficult to create a suitable
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Figure 21: The total amount of opened (mostly) uncritical and critical notifications
notifications in Host group 1 as shown in Kibana.
binning for both graphs. It would be possible with additional calculations in the
log-file parsing code, but was deemed to be out of the scope for this thesis since the
graphs are merely used as illustrations of indications, not proofs. A matching binning
was quickly found in Kibana by using a 0.5 hour interval, and it can be seen that
there is a correspondence between the notifications that the framework noted and
the notifications that actually were opened during the same time interval. Finally,
comparing the relevant amount notifications seen in Fig. 23 to the total amount of
opened notifications in Fig. 21 shows the framework’s capability to filter effectively
and can be seen as evidence for confirming the first experiment hypothesis that was
discussed previously.
The second experiment was to investigate tunable parameters, having the hy-
pothesis that the cooldown time and thresholds would be most important. However,
as seen in Fig. 25 which shows two graphs, choosing which notifications to include
or exclude in the configuration phase can create significant differences in how the
framework performs. The upper graph shows the notification count with all eight
notification types that were specified as interesting for HG2 and the lower graph the
notification count when a single notification type is excluded. The notification in
question is a YUM_error notification which is a custom notification (i.e., not provided
by the monitoring team, but created by a service responsible) that looks for errors
in the YUM packet managers log files and creates a notification if there is something
to investigate. It can be seen as an insignificant notification, but was included by
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Figure 22: The total amount of opened notifications in Host group 1 (red) during a
6-day run of the framework which actually open a ticket, showing that two specific
notifications (yellow, green) have caused sudden bursts.
specification. Having a high enough threshold can make such notifications very useful
for determining when something is wrong on a large scale rather than in independent
machines.
This brings up the point of tunable parameters. Fig. 25 shows that HG2 would
need a threshold slightly above 40, or it would need to be investigated if unsignificant
notifications are getting caught and account for added noise in the graphs. The
influence of cooldown time cannot really be observed in the figure. At the visible
smaller pikes in the beginning of the graph, it mostly rises and stays high for intervals
as long as a day. Having a short cooldown time could cause too many alerts, and
it would not be feasible to have day-long cooldown times. Further investigation is
necessary to be able to take a stance on the significance of the cooldown time. Lastly,
regarding a general limitation of the framework to avoid potentially harming host
groups with an excessive amount of actions, the difference of including or excluding
a certain notification is very visible in Fig. 25.
If the threshold is set to a conventient limit of around 40 for HG2 as previously
discussed, a sudden burst of a single notification (which may even have been placed
in the configuration as a test or by mistake) can cause the highest alert to be set
of and cause a false alarm. In the case shown in Fig. 25 the notification burst was
active for at least half a day. Neither a high threshold or a long cooldown time would
be good solutions, since the high threshold would silence every other notification in
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Figure 23: The amount of noted (unique active and opened) notifications in Host
group 1 during a 6-day run of the framework.
the figure, and a long cooldown time still would create alerts if the situation goes on
for more than half a day. Thus, as a remedy to false alarms, tuning and knowledge
of how the host group behaves is necessary. This task and this knowledge can be
done and acquired manually, but automating this step or aiding the manual process
are candidates for future work.
A summary of the number of notifications that were active, opened, which opened
a ticket, and which the framework noted can be seen in Fig. 26. Four permille
of the active or open messages that passed through the framework were such that
they were noted. Comparing the amount of notifications which created tickets (414)
and the amount of notifications noted by the framework (70), it can be seen that
less than a fourth of the tickets needed immediate attention. When comparing the
distribution of the notifications that the framework noted, seen in Fig. 23, it is seen
that there is often one machine which has a problem, and only on one day out of
six, two or three different machines have a problem. Several tickets that were noted,
concerned machines which sent a root_full notification, inicating that the root
storage partition was full. This is an example of an error that may or may not be
temporary and resolve itself. It can also be argued that, since the notification created
a ticket, someone might have resolved the problem manually during the course of
the experimental measurements. This type of self-resolving errors may differ from
service to service, and reflects the kind of environment-specific knowledge that is
required from a service responsible as they write a framework configuration file.
In conclusion, the framework was through experimentation shown to observe data
that was very similar to the information stored in Kibana, and to be able to filter out
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Figure 24: The amount of opened notifications in Host group 1 during the same
time as in Fig. 23 as seen in Kibana, when applying filters to exclude the same
notifications as those which the framework suppressed.
a significant amount of irrelevant notifications using the inclusion and exclusion lists
in the configuration files. It was also observed that the thresholds need to be adjusted
in order to have a fully functional framework, and that sudden bursts need to be
taken into account when setting the cooldown time and threshold limits. Finally,
it can also be noted that the framework can be used to create alerts when there
are several notifications that individually are insignificant, but in large amounts are
significant. This is useful in cases where a standard notification (that cannot be
changed easily) is interesting for a service responsible. It is then possible to add
this notification to the configuration file, and receive alerts for a notification that
normally would not create a ticket or send an e-mail.
6.3 Interviewing future users
To gain a better understanding of what functionality the framework is expected
to provide, a short interview was held with two main service responsibles which
belong to the group of possible future users. The six questions that were asked can
be found in Appendix D. The questions were designed based on the theoretical
background found in [66], which desecribes interviewing as a research methodology.
The objective of the interview was to determine in which kind of scenarios the sensors
and notifications (described in Section 3) are used, if the current notifications provide
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Figure 25: The amount of notifications in Host group 2 with and without an uncritical
notification.
Number Perc. of total
Active or open 1779217 100%
Open 13403 0.753%
Open, created tickets 414 0.023%
Active or open, noted
by framework
70 0.004%
Figure 26: Amount of notifications that were sent for Host group 1 in the measured
interval, discerning important notifications from less important notifications, as seen
in Figures 20– 24.
the desired functionality, and to investigate how filtering such notifications would
benefit the service responsibles.
Both interviewees confirmed, to begin with, that they use sensors, notifications,
as well as the other services provided by the monitoring team (e.g., visualisation
tools). In addition, one mentioned the use of Nagios for service level monitoring,
which it would be interesting to replace with Lemon sensors instead. The Kibana
dashboard was praised for saving time by automatically visualizing metric readings.
There was also a common need to monitor the infrastructure on machine level. This
functionality has been provided by the Lemon monitoring tool since the start. In
a large service, the aggregation is needed for filtering purposes, to be able to set
a threshold in order to avoid a constant flow of the same information to a service
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responsibles inbox or list of tickets. The small service focuses on monitoring as an
important tool for providing a better service by not wasting time on false alarms
and noticing real problems in time. In general, no case for these two services could
be identified where monitoring could not be done by a Lemon sensor.
The preferred methods for alerting vary between the two cases. In one interviewees
opinion, e-mails are acceptable, in the other case they are to be avoided. Urgent
issues are wished to be relayed by tickets in the small service and by SMS or other
fast methods in the large service, since the small service is less critical than the large
service. One interviewee notes that e-mail notifications have become less and less
interesting in favor of spending more time on having a better design to start with,
depending on how critical a problem is. Indeed, it is a matter of both priorization
and available possibilities. If the service is based on a commercial product, as some
of the small services are, it is difficult to make changes for a better design. If the
service is architectured and maintained in-house, it is easier to make improvements
if a problem is found.
When receiving alerts, it is agreed upon that filtering and the possibility to set
thresholds are necessary features. On one hand, if a flood of pointless problems gets
reported, or if the same problem is reported several times, it disturbs the service
responsible instead of helping them solve the problem. One interviewee explains that
they use text messages (SMSs) sent to the phone as an urgent method, SNOW tickets
for relevant issues and the Kibana dashboard for less urgent problems. They also
continue to say that tuning is important, to know which problems define a broken
service, and to start aggregating such problems.
6.4 Lessons learned and a discussion on automated actions
Certain risks and limits regarding the use of the framework need to be acknowledged
and understood before using it in a production environment. One main risk is that
a wrongly configured framework could either start flooding the service managers
with e-mails if the threshold is set too low, or the wrong notification is included
or excluded. To mitigate this problem, the cooldown time limit was put in place.
There is also the risk that now, as the framework executes all found policies for a
single host group, there are cases when one notification can trigger several policies
which may have internal conflicts. These conflicts can arise if the framework is badly
configured, or if the user is simply not aware of the fact that a single notification can
be counted in several (matching) host groups.
Regarding these problems, there can be parallels drawn to one of the large outages
in the Amazon Web Services public cloud [47] in 2011 that caused storage volumes
which lost the network connection to their replicas to try to replicate themselves all
at the same time as they regained the connection, which caused too much traffic,
and a large decrease in service availability. The problem also spread in a chain
reaction-like manner since the aggressive replication traffic started blocking other
storage volumes. Scenarios such as these are important to consider when partially or
completely automating actions in any environment.
Other outages in public clouds are discussed in a survey which also finds a lack
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in discussion and literature around cloud service outages [54]. The survey examines
outages among six services provided by five large cloud service providers and analyses
the downtime and availability, as well as lists the root cause for the outage. The
survey finds the largest causes of outages to be system issues, power outages, network
problems, hardware or software issues, or human mistakes. More exotic causes such
as natural disaster or vehicle accidents are found to be equally or more common
than hacking. Still, the sample of the study is very small (78 separate events) which
makes it difficult to draw conclusions. It is also difficult to classify a network routing
problem caused by human mistake as being in only one of these categories. The survey
discusses power outages as one of the most important issues, since it is the second
most common cause following "Other system issues". In relation to the framework,
software errors and human mistakes are deemed to be the most likely cause of any
malfunction, i.e., rebooting or killing machines due to a bug or malconfigured policy,
but as presented, best-effort attempts have been made to prevent such errors and
mistakes from happening.
Similarly, automated stock trading algorithms as well as bugs in such software
are believed to have caused, for example, a NASDAQ shutdown for three hours in
2013, a trading error which cost $460 millions, and a stock market crash in 2010 [40].
A government report was later published on this so called 2010 "Flash Crash", which
investigates its causes and effects [19]. The report states that "... the interaction
between automated execution programs and algorithmic trading strategies can quickly
... result in disorderly markets", which further reflects the risks of using software
with automated actions on a large scale. Recent developments in this case caused
charges to be pressed against an individual [20], in April 2015, who was arrested and
accused for modifying a trading program to execute an algorithm that created large
amounts of selling orders whose prices were subsequently modified, leading to the
cancellation of orders. This was later suspected to have caused an imbalance that
partially influenced the chain of events that lead to the crash. With this in mind, it
can still be noted that trading algorithms run in an entirely different environment
compared to the environment in which the framework is running, where no obvious
personal benefits can be gained by attempting to use the framework in a fraudulent
manner.
When analysing the interview responses, and reading that some services require
"prompt notification methods" for alerting a service responsible at, e.g., 3 AM,
other than SMSs, the author tried to consider the existence of commonly available
communication methods other than e-mail, dashboards and other Internet-related
technologies, SMSs and phone calls. Excluding more domain-specific devices such
as handheld radio transceivers, which also often are operated manually and not
automatically, the author attempted to investigate the use of pagers. They are
considered to be an almost obsoleted technology due to the introduction of other
mobile communication technologies, but remain in scarce use, in sectors where instant
alerting is a critical issue, e.g., in healthcare and in emergency situations such as
natural disasters where cellular networks are not a stable enough solution [50], [11].
The result of this brief investigation turned up an interesting article published
in 2014 that conceptually is related to the research and development in this thesis,
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namely the problem of experiencing too many alarms that are intertwined with
several false alarms. In medical devices, up to 80-99 percent of alarms appear to be
false [25]. As a remedy, the authors of the article, [25], have developed an "Alarm
Escalation System" based on pagers, to reduce the amount of alarms and filter
insignificant alarms. Currently the monitoring is done by humans who analyse and
manage waveforms of medical data. The article proposes using "filters, threshold
delays, fuzzy logic, and/or technical validation before alerting" which are techniques
that are either the same or very similar to the techniques in this framework. An
algorithm was developed that benefited from a categorization of alarms that had
been done using alarm data log files. A study was conducted that showed a decline
in alarms, and a shorter mean duration of the alarms, when all nurses carried a pager
connected to the alarm escalating system. The authors acknowledge that further
studies are necessary, but conclude that it is a viable option for hospital units that
do not have human monitors at all. While this concerns a totally different area of
industry compared to the aggregation framework described in this thesis, and while
the alarms are of higher criticality since human lifes are at stake, it is still interesting
to note that the basic and underlying principles in the end have a high similarity.
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7 Results and conclusions
This section describes the results of the thesis work as well as future work that will be
conducted. One of the major tasks is to fully implement the frameworks capability
to edit and close SNOW tickets, as was described in Section 5.2. As was seen, it is
currently possible to submit notifications to the dashboard, but the actual opening
of ticket has not been tested, since it would require minor changes in the ticketing
system. The current section explores future possible exensions of the framework, as
well as the direction this work will be taken in. As a note, when the framework has
evolved enough, it is planned to release it in the public domain, thus following the
CERN licencing guidelines35. Finally the conclusions are presented.
7.1 Results from the survey
The survey described in Section 6.3 was during the final weeks of thesis work extended
to collect responses and opinions from a larger audience, including the rest of the
section and the group, as well as other sections such as the monitoring team and the
cloud service team, upon whose services this framework is based. The questionnaire
was opened after a presentation held by the author, for this audience, during a weekly
topical meeting [55]. The intention was to familiarize the audience with the new
features that the framework is able to provide, before inviting these future users to
respond to the survey which would help the author understand the needs of the users,
to guide the future work. A specific empty checkbox was added to the survey, that
the respondents needed to check, asking for their permission to use their response in
an anonymous summary of all responses, and publishing it in this publicly available
thesis work as follows below.
Few responses were collected. The general opinion from the extended survey
seems to be that the Lemon sensors are comprehensively used and "get the job done",
but that there is a true lack for an aggregation feature such as the one this framework
provides. In a sense, it is encouraging to see that different sections are expressing
the same needs, which can be taken as an indication that this framework truly will
fill a gap that currently exists in the monitoring infrastructure. One respondent also
explicitly wishes for the threshold functionality, i.e., knowing only when 5 nodes start
failing instead of getting notified when a single node fails. Regarding the notifications,
there is an opinion that more work should be aimed towards providing a stable service
than creating alerts, but that self-healing properties and notification systems that
create less noise are wished for. Also, the majority of the respondents experience
most kind of alerts as "annoying" which hints at a need to develop strategies for
further minimizing the amount of alerts that are sent out. It is a challenge for future
work to investigate possible solutions for fulfilling these requests which the user
community made in the survey.
35https://legal.web.cern.ch/licensing/software
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7.2 Extending the framework to cover other services
The first version of the framework was developed following the specifications and
needs that were discovered in a large use case, the host groups managed by the batch
team. The reason for focusing on this case, was that there are more notifications and
problems to be found in a large case which makes it easier to test that the framework
is functioning as expected. This amount of errors can be trivially concluded from
the fact that when errors occur with a certain frequency on a machine, it is more
likely to always have some errors in a very large set of machines. As a reminder,
there are around 3000 machines in the batch host groups, several of them are under
high load, which should not make it surprising that contact may be lost with one or
two machines every day.
When considering other services, especially inside the author’s section, it can be
noted that most of these are small-scale services. As an example of a new service to
cover, currently the version control services (VCS) have notifications for machine
stats (e.g., CPU and memory consumption), but the actual service monitoring is
done, for example, by cronjobs which send emails in case they fail. To integrate the
VCS service monitoring into the existing framework, it is necessary to create suitable
notifications and work out a policy that can be entered into the framework. It will
be interesting to see how a small service can benefit from the framework, since the
amount of notifications will be significantly fewer.
It is also worth noting that no special adaptation is required from the framework
point of view when employing it to monitor a new service. The only thing that is
required, is a configuration file, such as previously described, which indicates which
notifications are significant and which are not.
7.3 Integration with Rundeck
Several softwares are being evaluated at CERN for use cases related to both monitoring
as well as other topics, such as configuration management or VM deployment. The
author has considered some of these softwares as candidates for integration into the
framework. Rundeck36 is one of these. It is a service for automating predefined
workflows which are performed in steps. It can be seen as a collection of commands
or scripts that are defined and executed in the specified order. Each step or command
can be rolled back if it fails, and the whole process can be triggered either using
a REST API or manually in a web interface. One methaphorical description of
Rundeck that is known to the author from discussions with service responsibles, is
that it is a "cronjob on steroids".
The reason for this description is that Rundeck can perform similar tasks to what
a collection of scripts could be made to do, but saves the user from writing the code
that surrounds actual commands, for example, code for checking the output of a
command and determining whether the command was successful or not. Rundeck
manages to provide a framework that performs the general steps that are involved
in a service responsibles daily workflow, e.g., periodically running the same script
36http://rundeck.org/
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on multiple machines, following up that the script does what it is expected to do,
indicating if the script worked or not and providing the capability to rewind what
the script did if it failed. This makes it a useful tool for service responsibles, since
they can work on a higher level of abstraction, thinking of workflows, instead of, e.g.,
writing code for distributing the actual code across machines. The service is still
being investigated and tested at CERN [45], even though there is a steady interest
in using the software for various automated tasks.
7.4 Future visions and collaborating with the monitoring team
Another topic that is being explored by the monitoring team, is the use of stream
computing software for aggregating metrics. The technology is also of interest to the
analytics working group that was discussed previously in Section 1.2. At the moment
of writing, in May 2015, the monitoring team is taking their first steps in testing out
Apache Spark37. However, their first use case and needs are different from the goals
that were outlined for this thesis work. The monitoring team receives large streams
of metric data from all machines which belong to the Lemon monitoring framework
and hopes to be able to compute and filter out relevant values from these streams
using stream computing technology [6].
If the monitoring team decides to pursue stream computing as a core technology
for metrics aggregation, it would be interesting to attempt to perform the same
tasks as the newly developed framework does, but using stream computing. The
benefits of a successful implementation could be an application that is more closely
integrated to the monitoring infrastructure than a separate framework. If possible,
an environment that would be similar to the metric and sensor infrastructure could
be created, but for notification aggregation.
In the same way that users today write their custom Lemon metrics (and notifi-
cation for the metrics), a centralized service based on stream computing technology
could allow users to write their own notification (and why not metrics) aggregation
code, that would be managed and run in the same manner as the Lemon monitoring
framework is run. From a user point of view, writing the aggregation code for the
stream computing service would replace the work spent on writing configuration files
for the framework. This can be less error-prone, since choosing one of the major
stream computing softwares instead of the framework, means choosing a tool that
has existed for longer, has a larger user community, more documentation, and that
has been tested and used more extensively.
7.5 Evaluation of the used methodologies
The thesis work was done focusing on solving a common problem in information
technology management: ensuring that a service works, while spending as little
time as possible debugging and searching for the error, and instead being able to
understand and address the issue directly. In order to understand the problem
domain, documentation and available literature was investigated, the author gained
37https://spark.apache.org/
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insight on the current situation from discussions with the involved teams, and different
solutions were explored, as discussed in Sections 3 and 4, before choosing to develop
a framework for this task.
From the authors point of view, experience was gained in several areas. OpenStack
was the only software that the author had any previous and mentionable experi-
ence with, as well as general software development experience. The configuration
management tools, the CERN monitoring framework, several state-of-the-art cloud
monitoring solutions that were evaluated, Perl, YAML, and a number of Python
modules are among the concepts that the author learned during this thesis work.
As a conclusion regarding the methodologies for the software development, it
cannot be stressed enough that it is important to be able to choose the right tools
and adhere to good software development practices from the beginning, since having
a fluent workflow will save time during the whole process. The author wished to find
a Python IDE (Integrated Development Environment) of similar quality as the ones
available for Java or the C language family, but did not succeed. PyCharm38 was
the best IDE the author discovered, but the author found it resource-consuming to
use. Instead the author resorted to another popular alternative, using a text editor
(vim) with various plugins to imitate the shortcuts and benefits an IDE provides,
which proved to be a decent alternative. Writing and having unit tests for testing the
framework also proved to be helpful when debugging or ensuring that the framework
works as intended.
The framework was evaluated by conducting experiments as outlined in Section 6.2.
The tests were planned with two hypotheses in mind that were evaluated and discussed.
As a whole, information gathered from the experiments could be shown to motivate
the advantages of using the framework compared to not having such a tool. As can be
observed from the figures in Section 6.2, using Kibana to perform manual aggregation
of the notifications proved to be a powerful mean of creating visual representations of
the notifications that are sent in the CERN monitoring infrastructure. Gathering data
from the framework in form of log files, and being able to compare these measurements
with trustworthy data stored by components in the existing monitoring infrastructure
added to the credibility of the experiments.
It is also an advantage to be able to repeat the measurements, since the involved
data is stored and easily available for a reasonable amount of time. In the case of
the data that is graphed in Kibana (and stored in ElasticSearch) it is for example
deleted after one month, but retrievable afterwards in a different format by loading
it straight from the HDFS storage that is part of the Lemon monitoring framework.
Regarding the interview, it was hoped that there would be more answers available.
Significant reasons may be the effort required to write down answers which describe
the current use of the monitoring infrastructure, and the effort to evaluate how a
service responsible would use it differently, and which functionality they would wish
that an improved infrastructure would bring.
38https://www.jetbrains.com/pycharm/
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7.6 Conclusions
Quoting one response from the extended survey on the future of the framework, "It’s
a real problem that we only have node monitoring and absolutely no framework for
application/service monitoring", the author is confident that the framework that was
developed and described in this thesis can be an asset for service managers in the
department of IT at CERN. The framework is also intended to be released in the
public domain as previously mentioned. This means that the public can benefit from
the alerting capabilities of the framework and freely extend it for their own use, by
primarily making sure their MQ software is supported by the Twisted library, and
changing the code for parsing the messages from the queue, since the messages are
very likely of a different format.
It would have been interesting to investigate the existing tools deeper by installing
and evaluating them in comparison to the framework. In the beginning, various
methods such as creating a specific policy definition language, and using a rule engine
to perform the aggregation were discussed. However, it was an explicit wish to have
a lightweight, and easily maintainable framework that could be integrated in the
existing infrastructure without significant dependencies, and the described framework
was deemed to be the best solution. The author is grateful to have gained much
experience from planning, implementing and testing the framework and meanwhile
learning to understand the different pieces of the existing infrastructure as well as
several related technologies.
During the course of the project at least three different projects at CERN were
identified which have similar ideas and goals in mind. First, the data center emergency
shutdown project which is still being planned. Secondly, the project for monitoring
the messaging brokers and automatically sending an e-mail if a broker malfunctions
done by the distributed computing (i.e., grid) group (see Section 1.2). Finally, the
third project is the monitoring team’s pursuit towards gaining a deeper understanding
of the metrics they collect (see Section 7.4). This indicates that the topic explored
in the thesis work is of general interest in several areas of IT at CERN.
In the future, more sensors and notifications will be added to the monitoring
solution of the section in order to take advantage of the framework. The ability
to automatically submit, modify, and close tickets will be fully implemented. It
also stands as an interesting challenge to pursue the new ideas and the possible
collaboration that were outlined in Section 7.4. As a whole, this thesis work consists
of a study and implementation that can be used as a helpful model for any future
notification aggregation tool at CERN, whether it be based on the framework itself,
or developed based on another technology.
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A Taxonomy of monitoring tools
Figure A1: Taxonomy of cloud monitoring tools in [81].
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B An excerpt from a sample notification dictionary
{ ...
u’batchsystem/batch/gridworker/aishare/share ’:
{u’exception.YUM_Transactions ’: set([u’b6119a5b37 ’]),
u’exception.ipmi_wrong ’: set([u’lxbsu0625 ’,
u’lxbsu2307 ’,
u’lxbsu2406 ’]),
u’exception.pool_full ’: set([u’b627bfb4f8 ’]),
u’exception.puppetd_wrong ’: set([u’b6b2d448b4 ’,
u’b6cfdb6fed ’]),
u’exception.swap_io ’: set([u’b6db383634 ’]),
u’puppetd_run_errors ’: set([u’b60c202d9b ’,
u’b61e5f7dbb ’,
u’b62dc5e259 ’,
u’b646ad7d82 ’,
u’b6548cce50 ’,
u’b67571e248 ’,
u’b67dac7ec7 ’,
u’b681202474 ’,
u’b697d50ba2 ’,
u’b69b36936e ’,
u’b6bcd0f48c ’,
u’b6d3bcc1a4 ’])},
u’batchsystem/batch/gridworker/cms/cmscaf ’:
{u’puppetd_run_errors ’: set([u’b657c5255a ’])},
u’batchsystem/batch/gridworker/terminate ’:
{u’exception.root_full ’: set([u’b67128f9a4 ’]),
u’puppetd_run_errors ’: set([u’b5026d70ea ’,
u’b52a1fc2f1 ’])},
u’boinc/vm ’:
{u’exception.YUM_error ’: set([u’boincaivb07 ’])},
... }
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C Profiling the framework
A short investigation was done with the profiling module cProfile using the follow-
ing parameters: python -m cProfile -s time monni.py, letting the framework
run for two hours, and showing the top 40 results with the total accumulated time
that has been spent calling a certain function. The main observation is that much
time is spent communicating with the database and polling for new messages.
1 Ordered by: internal time
2
3 ncalls tottime percall cumtime percall filename:lineno(function)
4 15404 4061.570 0.264 4061.570 0.264 {method ’commit ’ of
5 ’sqlite3.Connection ’ objects}
6 55859 3018.900 0.054 3018.900 0.054 {method ’poll ’ of ’select.epoll ’
7 objects}
8 48653340 77.011 0.000 103.920 0.000 parser.py:134( _parseBody)
9 38870 64.758 0.002 263.922 0.007 parser.py:62( add)
10 25906145 42.967 0.000 89.965 0.000 parser.py:117( _parseHeader)
11 74017158 39.144 0.000 39.144 0.000 {method ’write ’ of ’cStringIO.StringO ’
12 objects}
13 181268/60421 21.678 0.000 81.394 0.001 decoder.py :162( JSONObject)
14 3747978/120842 16.816 0.000 82.636 0.001 scanner.py:38( iterscan)
15 15405 14.554 0.001 14.554 0.001 {method ’execute ’ of ’sqlite3.Cursor ’
16 objects}
17 2945089 9.505 0.000 9.505 0.000 {_json.scanstring}
18 5734178 9.195 0.000 9.195 0.000 {isinstance}
19 483546/60458 9.061 0.000 4249.272 0.070 defer.py :1088( _inlineCallbacks)
20 906943/906877 6.572 0.000 12.812 0.000 defer.py:503( _runCallbacks)
21 1813208 6.461 0.000 12.779 0.000 parser.py:156( _unescape)
22 1087919 6.340 0.000 27.049 0.000 frame.py:86(<genexpr >)
23 1934086 6.309 0.000 12.911 0.000 frame.py:111( _escape)
24 1027492 5.714 0.000 9.988 0.000 parser.py:149( _decode)
25 2054962 4.976 0.000 8.322 0.000 frame.py:108( _encode)
26 1312769 4.846 0.000 10.772 0.000 decoder.py :152( JSONString)
27 483516/60462 4.718 0.000 4249.902 0.070 defer.py :1241( unwindGenerator)
28 680180 4.467 0.000 4.467 0.000 frame.py :114( headers)
29 3428442 4.409 0.000 4.409 0.000 {built -in method scanner}
30 8567071 4.360 0.000 4.360 0.000 {built -in method end}
31 3747294 3.619 0.000 3.619 0.000 util.py:26( __call__)
32 1027496 3.575 0.000 16.407 0.000 {map}
33 241711 3.457 0.000 5.484 0.000 commands.py :317( _checkHeader)
34 4059829/4059685 3.001 0.000 3.406 0.000 {getattr}
35 1873989 2.629 0.000 2.629 0.000 {built -in method match}
36 3747294 2.603 0.000 2.604 0.000 util.py:14( get)
37 1027492 2.577 0.000 2.577 0.000 {_codecs.ascii_decode}
38 1934086 2.511 0.000 3.870 0.000 util.py:5( escape)
39 306471 2.473 0.000 3.885 0.000 decoder.py:60( JSONNumber)
40 2054962 2.406 0.000 2.406 0.000 {_codecs.ascii_encode}
41 1148383 2.364 0.000 3.402 0.000 parser.py:78( _flush)
42 1813208 2.334 0.000 3.579 0.000 util.py:8( unescape)
43 906604 2.281 0.000 2.281 0.000 {method ’split ’ of ’unicode ’ objects}
44 4170409 2.243 0.000 2.243 0.000 parser.py:162( version)
45 429098/429094 2.218 0.000 29.394 0.000 {method ’join ’ of ’str ’ objects}
46 1148383 2.211 0.000 5.613 0.000 parser.py:93( _transition)
47 1571411/181363 2.124 0.000 4242.761 0.023 {method ’send ’ of ’generator ’
48 objects}
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D Interview questions for service responsibles
1. Do you use the monitoring framework tools (Sensors/Notifications/Kibana)?
When? What do you think about them?
2. (a) Describe your monitoring scenario for which you want to use or create a
sensor or notification.
(b) Describe your monitoring scenario for which you do not want to use or
create a sensor or notification.
3. How do you want to be notified that your service does not work? Has your
opinion on this changed during your lifetime/career?
4. What is your reaction when you receive one or many SMSs, e-mails, SNOW
tickets, or other alarms notifying you that a service does not work?
5. Would it help to filter or aggregate such alarms? Which of these alarms? How?
6. Anything you wish to say regarding service monitoring? Any question that
was unexpected or left out?
